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Abstract 
 
 
 
This thesis is about one of John McDowell’s epistemic arguments for perceptual 
disjunctivism. According to the argument in question we can know things on the basis 
of perception only if perceptions provide us with different epistemic reasons than 
phenomenally indistinguishable hallucinations and this is possible only if perceptions 
have mind-independent states of the world as constituents and are hence a different 
kind of experiential state from hallucinations, as the perceptual disjunctivist suggests. 
I argue against some detractors that there is an argument with this structure to be 
found in McDowell’s writings. I then argue that McDowell’s own version of the 
argument fails because it relies on commitments to certain theses which generate 
problems for the argument. I then describe an alternative version of the argument. The 
alternative version of the argument relies on a distinctive theory of what it is for 
perceptions to provide their subjects with epistemic reasons. According to this theory, 
perceptions are not themselves reasons to believe things about the world but enable us 
to possess reasons which are then thought of as the states of the world they relate us 
to: perceptions are not reasons but are ways of possessing reasons. I attempt to 
develop this theory, defend it against some objections, and I argue that if it is correct 
then the epistemic argument can be got to work without any commitment to the 
problematic theses McDowell’s version of the argument commits itself to.  
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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
Perceptual experiences of the world put us in a position to know things about the 
world. According to one influential epistemological tradition ways of knowing things 
about the world like perception put us in a position to know things about the world 
because they provide us with good reasons to believe things about the world. 
According to this tradition then, perceptions provide us with good reasons to make 
judgements about the world and this is what enables those judgements to constitute 
articles of knowledge. This conception of the manner in which perceptual experiences 
puts us in a position to know things is of course highly controversial but I will not be 
questioning it in this thesis, instead I will work with the assumption that it is correct.  
John McDowell works with the assumption that it is correct in his writings on 
knowledge in general and perceptual knowledge in particular1. Distinctively 
McDowell thinks that the claim that perceptual experience provides good reasons to 
make judgements about the world implies that experience must have a certain 
structure, a structure that the doctrine of disjunctivism about perception ascribes to it. 
It is with the claim that an inference can be made from the claim that perceptual 
experience provides us with good reason to believing things about the world to the 
claim that a disjunctive account of perception is true that is my concern in this essay.  
I want to prove three things. The first is that there is an argument which moves 
from the claim that perceptual experiences provide one with good reasons to judge 
things about the world to be found in McDowell’s writings. That there is an argument 
                                                 
1 McDowell (1982), (1986), (1994), (1995), (1996), (2002), (2008a), (2008b)  
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with such a structure to be found in McDowell’s writings is a thesis which is 
questioned by commentators who doubt that he endorses disjunctivism at all2. The 
task of chapter one is to prove that there is an argument of that structure to be found in 
McDowell’s writings. Chapter one will also provide an exposition of the disjunctive 
theory of experience.  
The second thing I what to prove is that the version of the argument for perceptual 
disjunctivism that McDowell himself propounds is problematic. In chapter two I’ll 
spend some time setting out his version of the argument and I will argue that although 
there is an objection that can be made to it which can be successfully rebutted by 
McDowell there are three other objections to it which it is at least not obvious that 
McDowell can mount a successful response to.  
During my exposition of McDowell’s version of the argument which purports to 
infer perceptual disjunctivism from the claim that perceptions provide us with good 
reasons to believe things about the world I will ascribe to him several theses about the 
nature of epistemic reasons in general and about perceptual reasons in particular. In 
chapter three I want to show that if those theses are rejected the a theory of perceptual 
reasons can be constructed which enables one to construct, in turn, a version of the 
argument for perceptual disjunctivism with the structure described which avoids the 
objections which beset McDowell’s version of the argument. This is the third thing I 
want to prove. I will end chapter three with an attempt to defend the distinctive theory 
of perceptual reasons which is used to construct the second version of the argument 
for perceptual disjunctivism.  
                                                 
2 Byrne & Logue (2008), Haddock & Macpherson (2008), Snowdon (2004) 
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I 
 
Disjunctivism 
 
 
 
 
 
Genuine perceptions of mind-independent objects cannot be told apart from 
hallucinations of those very same objects solely by reflecting on what it is like for one 
to undergo them. Disjunctivists about perceptual experience deny that it follows from 
this that all’s the same with one’s experiential state whether one has a perception of 
an object or a hallucination of the same object. They deny this because they want to 
say that mind-independent objects and their properties are constituents of the 
experiential states that make up genuine perceptions whereas hallucinations have no 
such constituents and hence the two are fundamentally different kinds of experiential 
state. This essay is about the ramifications of this collection of claims for the theory of 
perceptual knowledge. In this first chapter I want to set out the disjunctive theory of 
perception more fully. I will then attempt to establish that McDowell endorses the 
view. Finally I’ll set out in schematic form the epistemological argument in favour of 
it presented in his writings and to be discussed subsequent chapters.  
 
 
 
1.  
 
There are various ways of presenting the doctrine of disjunctivism about perception 
but following M.G.F. Martin I’ll present it as a distinctive response to the argument 
from hallucination, an argument which attempts to establish a counter-intuitive result 
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concerning the nature of genuine perceptions of mind-independent objects3. In this 
section I’ll present the argument from hallucination and in the following section I’ll 
present disjunctivism as a response to it.  
When we enjoy a veridical perception of a flickering candle there is some mental 
state that we in. This mental state is distinctively experiential, which is just to say that 
it has various features which distinguish it from other mental states like beliefs about 
the candle, or desires or emotions directed towards it, for example. Perhaps the most 
prominent feature of the perceptual state that distinguishes it from states of other 
kinds is its distinctive phenomenal character: what it feels like to enjoy a perception 
of a mind-independent object. What it feels like to enjoy a perception of a flickering 
candle is very different from what it feels like to believe that there is a flickering 
candle or to dislike the fact that there is a flickering candle.  
Reflection on the distinctive sort of phenomenal character possessed by the 
experiential state constitutive of a perception of a flickering candle seems to reveal 
something about its intrinsic nature: a property it has which marks it out as the 
distinctive kind of experiential state it is. Reflection on what it is like to perceive a 
flickering candle reveals that the candle itself and the properties our experience 
presents it as having are constituents of the experiential state one is in when one 
perceives it and, more generally that experiential states which constitute instances of 
veridical perception have mind-independent objects and the properties out experience 
presents them as having as constituents4.  
Part of what this means is that that we couldn’t be in the kind of experiential state 
we are in when he perceive a mind-independent object were the object not to exist or 
were the object not to possess the properties our experience presents it as having: we 
couldn’t be in the kind of experiential state we are in when we perceive the flickering 
candle if there were no flickering candle or were to fail to have a flickering flame, for 
example.  
Another way of putting this point is by saying that the experiential state that we are 
in when we perceive the candle constitutes a relation between us and the candle itself 
as well as whatever properties the candle has that our experience of it presents us 
                                                 
3 Martin (2004); (2006)  
4 From now on the claim that the experience that constitutes a genuine perception of an object has the 
object itself as a constituent – a claim which I’m using to gloss naïve realism, here – should be taken as 
elliptical for the claim that the experience that constitutes a genuine perception of an object has the 
object itself and the properties of it that are present to one by one’s experience as constituents.  
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with. Generalising this, the point is that experiential states which constitute instances 
of veridical perception relate us to mind-independent objects and their properties 
present in our environment5. Call this thesis about the nature of veridical perception 
naïve realism about veridical perception. 
We have been considering the case of an individual who has a perception of a 
flickering candle. Now consider the following less common case:  
 
Experiment. Daisy has volunteered to be the subject of an invasive 
scientific experiment. As part of the experiment Daisy will have the 
top part of her head numbed by local anaesthetic so that a surgeon 
can remove part of her skull to gain access to the part of her brain 
responsible for outputting visual experiences. The surgeon will 
stimulate that part of Daisy’s brain and she is to describe to the 
surgeon what she seems to see. As part of the experiment the room 
in which Daisy is seated is darkened and a candle with a flickering 
flame is placed on a stool in front of her. The surgeon asks Daisy to 
stare at the candle throughout the experiment. At the beginning of 
the experiment the surgeon does not tamper with Daisy’s brain and 
she a genuine perception of the flickering candle. Throughout the 
remainder of the experiment the surgeon intermittently manipulates 
Daisy’s visual centres in such a way that she undergoes 
hallucinations of a flickering candle on the stool in front of her 
which feel exactly the same to her as genuine perceptions of the real 
candle on the stool in front of her. At any given time during the 
experiment Daisy cannot tell solely on the basis of what it is like for 
her to undergo her visual experiences of a flickering candle whether 
she is undergoing a hallucination of the candle or perceiving the real 
thing. This is reflected in her descriptions of what she is 
experiencing: whenever the surgeon asks her what she is 
experiencing she responds by saying ‘I’m seeing the flickering 
candle on the stool in front of me’.  
                                                 
5 Likewise from now on I will take the claim that experiences constitutive of genuine perceptions of an 
object constitute a relation between a subject and the object itself to be elliptical for the claim that 
experience constitutive of genuine perceptions of an object constitute a relation between a subject and 
the object itself and the properties of the object that the experience presents it as having themselves.  
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In experiment as far the phenomenology of each experiential state is concerned, 
Daisy cannot tell apart her hallucinatory experience and her genuine perception of a 
flickering candle. Call hallucinations like those which Daisy suffers perfect 
hallucinations because they perfectly match the phenomenology of the perceptions 
they replicate. The argument from hallucination says that it follows from the fact that 
the experiential state constitutive of a genuine perception of the flickering candle is 
phenomenologically indistinguishable from the experiential state constitutive of a 
mere perfect hallucination of a flickering candle that both experiential states have the 
exact same intrinsic nature: that the phenomenal indistinguishability of perceptions 
from corresponding perfect hallucinations entails that perceptions are the same kind 
of experiential state as hallucinations. Following Martin we can call the claim that 
hallucinatory states and perceptual states are the same sort of experiential state the 
common kind assumption6.  
Care should be taken when attempting to understand what it is to say that 
hallucinatory states and genuine perceptual states are the same in kind. This is 
because there are ways of understanding what it is for two states to be different in 
kind on which the common kind assumption comes out as trivially false even though 
it is not7. It might be thought, for example, that if there is any property one state 
possesses but another state lacks then the two are different in kind. On this liberal way 
of understanding what it is for two states to be different in kind Daisy’s perception of 
a flickering candle and hallucination of a flickering candle are different in kind 
because Daisy’s perception occurs at 10.10am whereas her hallucination occurs at 
10.15am: her perception is a 10.10am experience whereas her hallucination is a 
10.15am experience so the two are different kinds of experiential state. The liberal 
way of individuating kinds of state implies that the common kind assumption is false, 
and obviously so.  
But the common kind assumption is not obviously false. This means that there must 
be a less liberal way of individuating kinds of state and the common kind assumption 
must be read using this less liberal conception. On this less liberal way of 
individuating kinds of state there are properties that a state has that are more 
fundamental to it than other properties such as the particular time at which it occurred 
                                                 
6 Ibid 
7 See Ibid, pp.360-361 
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or it’s particular causes. These more fundamental, basic, or intrinsic, properties 
delineate what we might think of as the essence of the state, if that word does not 
strike one as too spooky. This less liberal way of individuating kinds says that if two 
states are not identical with respect to the set of fundamental properties they have then 
they are different in kind. So mental states and physical states might thought of as 
being different in kind because it is a fundamental feature of all and perhaps only 
mental states that there is something that it is like to undergo them whereas this is not 
a fundamental feature of physical states.  
The common kind assumption should be read using this less liberal way of 
individuating kinds of state, and read this way it doesn’t come out as a trivial 
falsehood. Read this way the common kind assumption says that perceptions and 
hallucinations have all of their most fundamental properties in common and differ 
with respect only to their non-fundamental properties, for example their causal 
origins, and the argument from hallucination attempts to deduce it from the claim that 
perceptions are phenomenally indistinguishable from perfect hallucinations.  
Now, the experiential state one is in when one suffers a perfect hallucination of a 
flickering candle doesn’t have the flickering candle itself as a constituent. That is 
because it is not a fundamental feature of hallucinatory states that they constitute 
relations to mind-independent objects: hallucinations don’t have mind-independent 
objects as constituents. But it follows from the common kind assumption that the 
experiential state that constitutes one’s perception of a flickering candle has the same 
basic nature as the experiential state constitutive of a perfect hallucination of a 
flickering candle. It follows in turn, then, that one’s perception of a flickering candle 
does not have the candle as a constituent and that in general perceptual states don’t 
have mind-independent objects as constituents. This straightforwardly implies that 
naïve realism is false and that is the argument from hallucination’s counter-intuitive 
conclusion. 
It is important to be clear about what exactly the argument concludes and what 
naïve realism says. The argument concludes that perceptions don’t constitute relations 
between subjects and mind-independent objects, or, alternatively, that mind-
independent objects don’t partly constitute veridical experiences of them. This implies 
that when one enjoys a veridical perception the state one is in is exactly the same sort 
of thing as the state one would be in were one hallucinating: all is the same with one’s 
experiential state whether one is perceiving or hallucinating.  
12 
This is not to make the absurd suggestion that perceptions and hallucinations are 
the same thing. It is just to say that in so far as they are different what makes them 
different is not a fundamental feature of the experiential states that constitute them but 
rather some non-fundamental feature of them, such as their causal origins: a 
perception is just an experience that’s fundamentally the same in kind as a 
hallucination but which is caused in a certain way by the mind-independent object it is 
directed towards whereas a hallucination isn’t, for example. A naïve realist about 
veridical perception, by contrast, wants to say that what makes perceptions different 
from hallucinations is that they differ with respect to their most fundamental features. 
This is the claim that the argument from hallucination purports to falsify.  
So the argument from hallucination establishes that naïve realism is false. But the 
argument need not establish only this negative conclusion. The common kind 
assumption has it that perceptions are the same kind of experiential state as 
hallucinations. It follows from this that whatever theory one has of the fundamental 
nature of hallucinatory states is true of perceptual states as well. So if one endorses a 
sense-datum theory of hallucination which says that hallucinatory states have mind-
dependent objects as constituents the argument from hallucination establishes that a 
sense-datum theory of genuine perceptual experience is true as well. Or if one 
endorses an intentionalist theory of hallucination which says that hallucinatory states 
don’t have constituents at all, or alternatively that they fail to constitute relations to 
any kind of object at all be it a sense-datum or an external object, but are instead 
propositional attitudes which present propositions about the objects they are directed 
towards to the subject who undergoes them, the argument from hallucination 
establishes that such a theory is true of genuine perception as well8. The argument 
establishes both that naïve realism is false and that whatever non-naïve realist theory 
of the fundamental nature of hallucinatory experience is correct is also correct of the 
fundamental nature of veridical experience9.  
                                                 
8 See Crane (2001) for a statement of the intentionalist analysis of hallucination and perceptual 
experience in general. See Crane (2008) for an analysis of perceptual experience which claims that it is 
(a) non-relational or fails to have constituents but (b) claims that experiential states are not 
propositional attitudes. In virtue of making claim (a) the view deserves to be labelled ‘intentionalism’.   
9 Crane ((2001); (2005); (2006)) understands the argument from hallucination as purporting to establish 
the counter-intuitive conclusion that we do not perceive mind-independent objects ‘directly’ but only 
perceive them by being perceptually related to sense-date which in some sense resemble mind-
independent objects. In other words Crane presents the argument from hallucination as purporting to 
establish the truth of a sense-datum theory of perception. Indeed this is actually the orthodox way of 
presenting the argument (see, for example, Byrne & Logue (2008)). Following Martin I have presented 
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2. 
 
Disjunctivists want to deny that hallucinations and perceptions are experiential 
states that have the same basic nature: they want to deny the common kind 
assumption. They want to do this moreover, because they endorse naïve realism about 
perception understood as the claim that mind-independent objects are constituents of 
the experiential state one enjoys during episodes of perception. So disjunctivism is the 
conjunction of naïve realism about veridical perception and the claim that veridical 
perceptual experiences are different sorts of state from hallucinatory experiences. This 
second claim, moreover, follows straightforwardly from naïve realism as it is 
understood here given that it is not part of the intrinsic nature of hallucinatory 
experiences that they have mind-independent objects as constituents.  
So the disjunctivist will want to say that when Daisy perceives the flickering candle 
on the stool in front of her the candle is a constituent of the experiential state she is in 
whereas whenever she hallucinates a flickering candle on the stool as a result of the 
surgeon’s manipulation of her visual centres she is undergoing a fundamentally 
different kind of experiential state. Daisy’s perceptions and hallucinations don’t just 
differ with respect to their causal origins – they don’t differ only because her 
perception is caused in a certain way by the flickering candle itself whereas her 
hallucination isn’t, for example – but differ with respect to their intrinsic nature: 
Daisy’s perceptions are essentially experiences that have external objects as 
constituents whereas her hallucinations are essentially experiences which don’t.  
In establishing its negative and positive conclusions the argument from 
hallucination relies on the common kind assumption. It attempts to infer the common 
kind assumption from the true claim that it is not possible to tell that one is enjoying a 
veridical perception as opposed to a perfect hallucination by reflection solely on what 
it is like to be in either state. Because they deny the common kind assumption and 
                                                                                                                                            
it as purporting to establish that naïve realism is false and that either a sense-datum theory or an 
intentionalist theory of perception is true because I am using the argument solely as a means to present 
the disjunctive theory of perception and am therefore only interested in it in so far as it establishes that 
a certain component of that theory of perception – naïve realism – is false.  
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insist that perceptions and hallucinations are fundamentally two different kinds of 
experiential state disjunctivists deny that it follows from the phenomenal 
indistinguishability of perceptions and perfect hallucinations that the two experiential 
states are the same in kind. This is the disjunctivist’s distinctive response to the 
argument from hallucination: the argument fails because it moves invalidly from the 
claim that perfect hallucinations cannot be told apart phenomenologically from 
corresponding veridical perceptions to the claim that hallucinations are the same kind 
of experiential state as perceptions. So even though Daisy cannot tell them apart based 
solely on what it is like to undergo either, her perceptions of the flickering candle and 
her hallucinations of the flickering candle are different sorts of state. 
Because they deny the common kind assumption disjunctivists will not just have to 
deny the move from the phenomenal indistinguishability of perfect hallucinations and 
perceptions to the common kind assumption made by the argument from hallucination 
but also any other move from a true claim about the nature of experience to the 
common kind assumption. For example it could be argued that a given veridical 
perception and its perfect hallucination each have the same set of brain states as 
proximal causes and that it follows from this that they have the same intrinsic nature. 
The disjunctivist will have to find a way of blocking an inference like this if they are 
to give a full defence of their view of perception. The argument from hallucination is 
not the only argument which the disjunctivist must offer a response to. 
To say that perceptions and hallucinations are different kinds of experiential state is 
not to say that there aren’t descriptions of perceptions and hallucinations which are 
correct of both sorts of state. Both states can be correctly described, for example, as 
perceptual experiences: when one undergoes a perception of a flickering candle one 
can truthfully be said to be undergoing a perceptual experience just as when one 
undergoes a hallucination of a flickering candle one can also truthfully be said to be 
undergoing a perceptual experience. Similarly whenever a subject undergoes a 
perception or a hallucination of a flickering candle it will be true of them that they 
will be in the position to truthfully avow that they seem to see a flickering candle: that 
they seem to see a flickering candle is a correct description of their state of mind 
whether they undergo a perception or a perfect hallucination of a flickering candle.  
All of this is consistent with the disjunctivist’s denial of the common kind 
assumption. What’s distinctive about disjunctivism is that it says that these 
descriptions of a subject – that they are undergoing a perceptual experience of a 
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flickering candle or that they seem to see a candle for example – can be made true by 
two different sorts of experiential state. Non-disjunctivist’s will want to say, by 
contrast, that when it is true to say that a subject seems to see a flickering candle or 
that she enjoys an experience of one it is a single kind of experiential state that makes 
those descriptions of the subject true.  
So for the disjunctivist when it is true to say that a subject seems to see a flickering 
candle that is because she is either enjoying a genuine perception of a flickering 
candle or she is suffering a perfect hallucination of a flickering candle where the sorts 
of state picked out by each disjunct in that disjunction are different in kind. This 
explains why the theory is called disjunctivism10. For the non-disjunctivist on the 
other hand what makes it true to say that a subject seems to see a flickering candle is 
that she is undergoing a kind of experiential state that is common to both perceptions 
and hallucinations.  
 
 
 
3. 
 
I have given offered a generic specification of disjunctivism as the conjunction of 
naïve realism and the denial of the common kind assumption. As well as Snowdon 
and Martin, McDowell seems to endorse disjunctivism in a number of writings and in 
this section and the next this is what I want to prove, as the claim has become 
controversial as of late. That he endorses the thesis can seem obvious. Here is what he 
says, for example, in Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge (1982):  
 
In a deceptive [hallucinatory case] case, one’s experiential intake 
must ex hypothesi fall short of the fact itself [the state of the world 
presented to the subject by her perceptual experience and knowable 
                                                 
10 One point worth noting is that the thesis at the heart of disjunctivism need not have the logical form 
of a disjunction. The thesis in that when one has a perceptual experience one either has a genuine 
perception, which is one kind of state, or a hallucination, which is another. That thesis could just as 
easily be expressed by a sentence which does not have the form of a disjunction, for example by the 
sentence ‘when one undergoes a perceptual experience one could be enjoying a genuine perception, 
which is one kind of state, but one could be suffering a hallucination, which is another kind of state’. 
Rather misleadingly, disjunctivism does not, essentially, have anything to do with disjunctions (see 
Snowdon 2005, pp.137).   
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on the basis of it], in the sense of being consistent with there being 
no such fact. So that must be true, according to the argument, in the 
non-deceptive case too.11 
 
Here McDowell gives a summary of the conclusion of the argument from 
hallucination12. Shortly after this McDowell suggests that we should avoid this 
conclusion by adopting disjunctivism. He says that instead of embracing the 
conclusion of the argument we can:  
 
…say that an appearance that such-and-such is the case can be either 
a mere appearance or the fact that such-and-such is the case making 
itself perceptually manifest to someone. As before the object of 
experience in the deceptive case is a mere appearance. But we are 
not to accept that in the non-deceptive cases too the object of 
experience is a mere appearance, and hence something that falls 
short of the fact itself. On the contrary, the appearance that is 
presented to one in those cases is a matter of the fact itself being 
disclosed to the experiencer.13  
 
Here it is easy to read McDowell as saying that in cases of veridical perception – 
‘non-deceptive’ cases – one’s experience essentially relates one to a fact about the 
object presented to one and knowable on the basis of experience whereas in 
phenomenally indistinguishable hallucinatory cases – ‘deceptive’ cases – one’s 
experience instead relates one to a ‘mere appearance’. The disjunctivist says that 
experiential states constitutive of veridical perception are essentially relations 
between subjects and mind-independent objects as well as the properties of those 
objects presented to one in one’s experience of them and are therefore different in 
kind from hallucinatory experiences. In the above passage McDowell is suggesting 
that we should conceive of the experiential states constitutive of veridical perception 
as relations between subjects and facts about the objects presented to us by our 
                                                 
11 McDowell (1982), p.386 
12 McDowell actually refers to it as the argument from illusion (ibid, p.380 and pp.385-386. See also 
his (1995) pp.396-398) but we can ignore that detail here. 
13 McDowell (1982), pp.386-387 
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perceptions that are knowable on the basis of the experience. Is this tantamount to an 
endorsement of disjunctivism?  
 I think that it is. In the above passage as well as in the remainder of his (1982) we 
can think of McDowell as suggesting that a genuine perception of an O which is F is 
fundamentally a relation between a subject and a true proposition – or a fact – about O 
and its Fness whereas a hallucinatory experience, although phenomenally 
indistinguishable, is not. But if perceptions have facts about their objects and 
properties of those objects as constituents then they must also constitute relations 
between their subjects and the objects and properties in question. If they didn’t then 
they wouldn’t be able to have true propositions about those objects and properties as 
constituents in the first place. We can think of McDowell as suggesting that mind-
independent objects and the properties of them presented to one in experience are 
constituents of experience in virtue of being constituents of the facts about those 
objects that are themselves constituents of experience, even though this is not the case 
with hallucinatory experiences. Presented like that McDowell’s views clearly seem 
tantamount to disjunctivism, conceived of as the conjunction of naïve realism and the 
denial of the common kind assumption14. I will be largely ignoring these details of 
McDowell’s own particular version of disjunctivism in what follows and talk as if he 
endorses the simple generic version of the doctrine I presented in prior sections.  
In Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space (1986) McDowell seems to 
express his commitment to disjunctivism again:  
 
…of facts to the effect that things seem thus and so to one… some 
are cases of things being thus and so within the reach of one’s 
subjective access to the external world [i.e. veridical perceptual 
experiences], whereas others are mere appearances. 15  
 
Short of the fully Cartesian picture, the infallibly knowable fact – its 
seeming to one that things are thus and so – can be taken 
                                                 
14 I have only given the briefest of sketches of McDowell’s particular brand of disjunctivism here. The 
view is actually considerable more complicated. For example, McDowell wants to say that external 
objects and their properties get to be constituents of perceptual experiences in virtue of those 
experiences essentially having true demonstrative propositions as their content: objects are constituents 
of perceptions because perceptions are essentially factive propositional attitudes that pick out their 
referents using demonstrative expressions.  
15 McDowell (1986), p.241 
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disjunctively, as constituted  either by the fact that things are 
manifestly thus and so [e.g. in cases in which one sees that p] or by 
the fact that that merely seems to be the case.16 
 
In these passages McDowell can be read as suggesting that cases in which it is true 
that for all one’s experience suggests it seems to one as if the world is a certain way 
divide into two disjoint cases. In cases of the first kind one undergoes an experience 
with a state of external reality itself as a constituent: the object and its properties one’s 
experience relates one to are constituents of one’s experience, perhaps by being 
constituents of a fact that is itself a constituent of one’s experience. In cases of the 
second kind this is not the case. This is so even though cases of the second kind 
cannot be told apart phenomenologically from cases of the first: in both cases it is true 
that it seems to the subject that things are a certain way with the world. This seems 
quite clearly to be an endorsement of disjunctivism.  
But commentators on McDowell’s work such as Byrne and Logue (2008) and, 
more tentatively, Haddock and Macpherson (2008) and Snowdon (2005) want to deny 
that he endorses disjunctivism about perception. Instead they say that he endorses an 
epistemological thesis that is analogous to disjunctivism but which is neutral with 
respect to the truth of disjunctivism. Roughly, the thesis states that genuine 
perceptions and phenomenally indistinguishable hallucinations differ with respect to 
their epistemic properties. The commentators who suggest that McDowell doesn’t 
endorse disjunctivism want to say that his supposed avowals of disjunctivism such as 
those quoted above should actually be read as avowals of this epistemological thesis. 
Byrne and Logue even suggest that there is textual evidence which suggests that he 
thinks it’s false17. 
I think that they are correct to ascribe the epistemological thesis to him and that it is 
correct to say that the epistemological thesis doesn’t obviously have anything to do 
with disjunctivism but that they are wrong to think that we should therefore read 
                                                 
16 Ibid, p.242 
17 See Byrne and Logue (2008), pp.65-68, Haddock and Macpherson (2008), pp.4-13, and Snowdon 
(2005), pp.139-140. As noted Byrne and Logue say that McDowell actually thinks that disjunctivism is 
false. Snowdon thinks that it is not obvious that he endorses disjunctivism because it is not obvious that 
it follows from epistemic disjunctivism, which is the thesis McDowell seems mostly concerned with. 
Haddock and Macpherson think that McDowell’s views have undergone a development. They say that 
in his (1982) he doesn’t endorse it; in his (1986) it is not clear whether he endorses it; but that in his 
(1992) he explicitly endorses it. Commentators who think that McDowell does endorse disjunctivism 
include Crane ((2005), §3.4) and Martin ((2006), pp.356-357 fn.7).  
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McDowell’s supposed avowals of disjunctivism as avowals of this epistemological 
thesis. I’ll deal with that suggestion in the proceeding section. For now I want to deal 
with Byrne and Logue’s suggestion that there is textual evidence to suggest that 
McDowell actually thinks that disjunctivism is false.  
In favour of their claim that McDowell thinks that disjunctivism is false they quote 
the following passage from his recent The Disjunctive Conception of Experience as 
Material for a Transcendental Argument (2008a) where McDowell discusses the 
nature of the disjunctivist’s claim that when one has a perceptual experience as of a 
mind-independent object one either has a veridical experience of an object, which is 
one kind of state, or one has a non-veridical experience of an object, which is another 
kind of state:  
 
The two sides of the disjunction differ in epistemic significance… 
This difference in epistemic significance is of course compatible 
with all sorts of commonalities between the disjuncts. For instance, 
on both sides of the disjunction it appears to one, say, that there is a 
red cube in front of one.18 
 
Here, McDowell is expressing his commitment to the epistemological thesis 
analogous to disjunctivism mentioned above and to be discussed in sequel. In the 
passage he also suggests that the thesis is consistent with certain ‘commonalities’ 
between cases of veridical perception and non-veridical perception. Byrne and Logue 
take this commonality to be a shared fundamental experiential nature, and if that’s 
what McDowell’s suggesting in the above quotation then he is committing himself to 
the falsity of disjunctivism.  
But McDowell is surely not endorsing the claim that perceptions and hallucinations 
are the same kind of experiential state in the above paragraph. He seems only to be 
pointing out that whether one genuinely perceives a red cube in front of one or one 
suffers an indistinguishable non-veridical experience as of a red cube in front of one it 
will be true to say of one that it appears to one that there is a red cube in front of one, 
and as we saw in section three this claim is perfectly consistent with disjunctivism’s 
denial of the common kind assumption. So Byrne and Logue are incorrect to say that 
                                                 
18 McDowell (2008a), fn.15 
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what McDowell says in the above quote constitutes a commitment to the falsehood of 
disjunctivism.  
If it’s still in doubt whether McDowell endorses disjunctivism, consider the 
following highly revealing passage from Putnam on Mind and Meaning (1992):  
 
Compare the psychological feature that is unsurprisingly shared 
between someone who sees that such-and-such is the case and 
someone to whom it merely looks as if such-and-such is the case… 
It is not compulsory to conceive seeing that such-and-such is the 
case as constituted by the common feature together with the 
favourable facts about embedding in the environment. We can 
understand things the other was round: the common feature – its 
being to all intents and purposes as if one sees that such-and-such is 
the case – intelligibly supervenes on each of the divergent “wide” 
states. And it is better to understand things this way round.19  
 
Here McDowell is suggesting that we should not conceive of the state of seeing that 
some fact about the world is the case as an experiential state that is common between 
veridical and non-veridical visual perception, in conjunction with facts about the way 
such an experiential state is ‘embedded in the environment’. McDowell is denying, 
for instance, that we should identify what it is to see an O which is F as an 
experiential state which is common to a hallucination as of an O which is F but which 
is set apart from such a hallucinatory state by being caused by the O and its Fness. 
 Rather he is suggesting that we should conceive of the state of seeing an O which 
if F and the state of having a hallucination as of an O which is F as each constituted 
solely by different sorts of experiential states that are conceived of as ‘wide’ states: 
states which one can be in only if one’s environment is a certain way. McDowell is 
suggesting that we should identify seeing an O which is F solely with an experiential 
state that one can be in only if one’s environment is the way one’s experience presents 
it to be and that we should identify a hallucination as of an O which is F solely with 
an experiential state that one could be in even if one’s environment is not the way 
one’s experience presents it to be.  
                                                 
19 McDowell (1992), p.284 
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He then suggests that we should think of the ‘common element’ shared by 
perceptions and phenomenally indistinguishable non-veridical perceptual episodes – 
that it seems to one that the world is the way each kind of experience portrays it – as 
realised by or as supervening upon the different kinds of wide experiential states that 
constitute perceptions and hallucinations respectively. In virtue of claiming that the 
experiential states constitutive of perceptions and hallucinatory experiences are states 
that one can be in only if the world is a certain way it seems like McDowell is 
straightforwardly endorsing disjunctivism in the above passage.  
 
 
 
4. 
 
We have seen that there is textual evidence which suggests that McDowell 
embraces disjunctivism and that Byrne and Logue’s claim to the contrary lacks 
justification, in so far as that justification was supposed to be provided by the piece of 
textual evidence they took to favour their claim that McDowell is no disjunctivist. I 
now turn to a different way of justifying the claim that McDowell doesn’t endorse 
disjunctivism provided by the commentators mentioned in the preceding section 
according to which McDowell’s supposed avowals of disjunctivism are actually 
avowals of an epistemological thesis analogous to disjunctivism.  
The epistemological thesis in question can be presented as a response to an 
epistemic analogue of the argument from hallucination. This version of the argument 
purports not to establish a counter-intuitive thesis about the nature of veridical 
perception but a counter-intuitive thesis about the epistemological features of 
veridical perception. I’ll present the argument then present the epistemological 
analogue of disjunctivism as a response to it, before getting to the suggestion that 
McDowell’s supposed avowals of disjunctivism should actually be read as avowals of 
this epistemic thesis.  
Evie sees a burning weeping willow in front of her. Her visual experience is a case 
of sight, and as such it is a genuine perception: there really is a weeping willow on 
fire in front of her and she is having a visual experience of it. If Evie were to form a 
judgement with the content there is a weeping willow on fire in front of me she would 
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not only be making a true judgement but she would be making a judgement that her 
veridical visual experience of the burning weeping willow in front of her gives her 
good reason to make: her judgement would be made justified by her perceptual 
experience.  
But let’s imagine that Evie has a visual experience of a burning weeping willow in 
front her that isn’t a genuine perception of a burning weeping willow – isn’t a case of 
her seeing a burning weeping willow – but is actually a visual hallucination of a 
burning weeping willow that Evie cannot tell apart from a genuine sighting of a 
burning weeping willow based solely on what it is like for her to suffer it. In this case 
if Evie were to form a judgement with the content there is a weeping willow on fire in 
front of me she not only would be making a false judgement – assuming that there is 
actually not a weeping willow on fire in front of her, of course – but she would also 
not be making a judgement that her visual experience of a burning weeping willow in 
front of her gives her good reason to make: her judgement would not be made 
justified by her perceptual experience.  
Now, the epistemic analogue of the argument from hallucination asks us to infer 
from the phenomenal indistinguishability of Evie’s sight of a burning weeping willow 
in front of her and her hallucinatory visual experience of a burning weeping willow in 
front of her that both experiential states provide her with the exact same set of reasons 
to make judgements about objects they present to her and that a fortiori they provide 
her with the exact same reasons to make a judgement with the content there is a 
weeping willow on fire in front of me. In other words the epistemic analogue of the 
argument from hallucination says that it follows from the phenomenal 
indistinguishability of perceptions and perfect hallucinations that both are the same 
with regards to what reasons they give the subject to make judgements about objects 
they present to her. This is the epistemic analogue of the argument from 
hallucination’s equivalent of the common kind assumption made by the argument 
from hallucination proper I discussed earlier. Both arguments attempt to deduce their 
respective common kind theses from the claim that perceptions and hallucinations are 
phenomenally indistinguishable.  
Why exactly one might think that it follows from the phenomenal 
indistinguishability of perceptions and hallucinations that they provide the same 
reasons for judgements about the objects they present is something I’ll address in the 
next chapter. For now we can note that it follows from the claim that perceptions 
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provide the same reasons for judgements as hallucinations that a perception of an O 
which is F does not provide a good reason to judge that there is an O which is F, given 
that hallucinations of an O which is F fails to provide a good reason to make a 
judgement with that content. This is the counter-intuitive epistemological claim that 
constitutes the epistemic analogue of the argument from hallucination’s conclusion. 
Evie’s genuine perception of a burning weeping willow in front of her doesn’t give 
her a good reason to judge that there is a burning weeping willow in front of her 
afterall because her visual experience is phenomenally indistinguishable from a 
hallucinatory experience which does not provide good reason to make that judgement.  
There is an important corollary of the epistemic analogue of the argument from 
hallucination that I should note before offering a sketch of the response to the 
argument that constitutes the epistemological thesis analogous to disjunctivism that 
the commentators mentioned correctly ascribe to McDowell. The corollary is that if 
we assume that if genuine perceptions of an O which is F provide reasons for taking it 
to be true that there is an O which is F that are only as good as those which 
hallucinatory experiences of an O which is F provide to make the same judgements, 
as the argument establishes, they do not put us in a position to know that there is an O 
which is F then the argument establishes that even in cases of genuine perception we 
are not in a position to know propositions such as that just described on the basis of 
them. In other words if we assume that it is condition of having perceptual knowledge 
that p that perceptual experience must provide us with good reason to judge that p and 
if we assume that hallucinations provide us with no such good reason then the 
argument establishes a scepticism about perceptual knowledge.  
The epistemological thesis analogous to disjunctivism about perception which 
commentators correctly ascribe to McDowell consists in the claim that necessarily, 
veridical perceptions do provide better reasons to make judgements about the objects 
they present their subjects with than hallucinations and the claim, which follows, that 
genuine perceptions and hallucinations differ with respect to what reasons they give 
their subjects for making judgements about the objects they present: perceptions and 
hallucinations differ with respect to their epistemic properties. This is so, moreover, 
even though perceptions and hallucinations are phenomenally indistinguishable. Since 
this epistemological thesis shares a structure with disjunctivism about perception I 
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will label it epistemic disjunctivism and I will refer to the thesis about perception 
discussed in previous sections of this chapter as perceptual disjunctivism20.  
Assuming that if perceptions don’t provide us with good reasons to judge that p on 
the basis of them, as the epistemic analogue of the argument from hallucination 
purports to establish, then they don’t provide us with knowledge that p either, I noted 
that a corollary of the argument I’ve been discussing is a scepticism about perceptual 
knowledge. In so far as epistemic disjunctivism enables us to reject the argument in 
question it also gives us a way to reject the scepticism about perceptual knowledge the 
argument generates, albeit in conjunction with a certain thesis about the relation 
between knowledge and perceptual reasons. Genuine perceptions can provide us with 
knowledge about the world because unlike phenomenally indistinguishable 
hallucinations they give us good reasons to make the very same judgements about the 
world that constitute our knowledge of it, or so says the epistemic disjunctivist.  
It seems correct to claim that McDowell endorses this thesis. The most explicit 
confirmation of this is provided in his (2008a). We have already come across a 
passage from that paper in which McDowell expresses his commitment to epistemic 
disjunctivism, but here is another:  
 
Experiences of the first kind [genuine perceptions] have an epistemic 
significance that experiences of the second kind [phenomenally 
indistinguishable hallucinations] do not have. They afford 
opportunities for knowledge of objective states of affairs. According 
to the highest common factor conception [the claim that both kinds 
of experience have the same epistemic properties] appearances never 
yield more, in the way of warrant for belief, than do those 
appearances in which it merely seems that one, say, sees that things 
are thus and so.21  
 
                                                 
20 As Snowdon points out ((2008), p.35) the term ‘disjunctivism’ is now used as a label for views in 
such disparate areas of philosophy as the philosophy of perception (as we have seen), epistemology (as 
we have also seen), the philosophy of action, and the theory of reasons. For the most part I will be 
focusing on disjunctivism about perception although as will become apparent later disjunctivism about 
perception shares a common structure with views of the same name in the philosophy of action, 
epistemology, and theory of reasons. Indeed it is in virtue of this that those views share a name with the 
distinctive doctrine about the nature of perceptual experience that is my focus. 
21 McDowell (2008a), p.381 
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Here, McDowell can easily be read as saying that genuine perceptions provide one 
with different reasons – ‘warrant’ – for beliefs about the world than do hallucinations 
and that therefore they put one in a position to know things about the world, unlike 
hallucinations. McDowell is committing himself to epistemic disjunctivism in the 
above passage as well as the thesis that if genuine perception is to put us in a position 
to know anything about external reality then it must provide us with different reasons 
or warrant then phenomenally indistinguishable hallucinatory experiences.  
What has epistemic disjunctivism got to do with perceptual disjunctivism? The 
former thesis says that perceptions and hallucinations differ with respect to what 
reasons they provide for their subjects with whilst the latter says that perceptions have 
states of the world as constituents and are therefore different in kind from 
hallucinations. There is no obvious relation between them. It seems possible to hold 
perceptual disjunctivism without holding epistemic disjunctivism. This is because it 
seems possible to reject the idea that the phenomenal indistinguishability of 
perceptions and hallucinations entails that they are the same in kind whilst accepting 
the idea that it entails that they provide the subject with the same reasons. Likewise it 
seems that one can be an epistemic disjunctivist whilst remaining neutral on the truth 
of perceptual disjunctivism. This is because it seems possible to explain why 
perceptions and hallucinations differ with respect to their epistemic properties by 
pointing out that they differ with respect to some non-fundamental property – their 
causal properties, say – and this is consistent with the claim that the perceptual 
disjunctivist essentially wants to deny: that they are the same basic kind of state. 
Commentators who wish to deny that McDowell endorses disjunctivism seize on 
the fact that epistemic disjunctivism doesn’t obviously entail disjunctivism. Their 
reasoning seems to be as follows. McDowell obviously wants to endorse epistemic 
disjunctivism. But there is no clear separation between epistemic disjunctivism and 
perceptual disjunctivism in his presentation of either view. He often says things which 
look like avowals of perceptual disjunctivism but then talks as if what he has really 
avowed is epistemic disjunctivism and vice-versa. Given that his main concern is with 
epistemic disjunctivism this must mean that whenever he seems to endorse perceptual 
disjunctivism he actually means to endorse epistemic disjunctivism. But since that 
thesis seems consistent with the falsehood of perceptual disjunctivism McDowell 
doesn’t actually endorse the latter.  
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I think that this line of reasoning can be questioned. It is true that McDowell wants 
to endorse epistemic disjunctivism, as we have seen. It is also true that there is no 
clear separation between epistemic disjunctivism and perceptual disjunctivism in 
McDowell’s works: he does indeed say thing which look like avowals of perceptual 
disjunctivism – for example the passages quoted at the beginning of section three – 
but which he talks about as if they are avowals of epistemic disjunctivism and vice-
versa22. It doesn’t follow from the fact that McDowell equivocates between perceptual 
and epistemic disjunctivism and that he is really interested in arguing for the latter 
that his supposed avowals of perceptual disjunctivism should actually be understood 
as avowals of epistemic disjunctivism, however. This is because the best way to 
explain the equivocation between the two theses in McDowell’s work is that he sees 
them as intimately related and perhaps even equivalent. In other words I am 
suggesting that what explains why McDowell avows perceptual disjunctivism but 
then talks as if he has avowed epistemic disjunctivism and vice-versa is that he thinks 
that if one wants to endorse epistemic disjunctivism then the only way one will be in a 
position to do that is to endorse perceptual disjunctivism as well. 
If that’s what explains why McDowell equivocates between the two theses then 
there is no reason not to take McDowell’s avowals of perceptual disjunctivism at face 
value: McDowell is interested, first and foremost, in establishing epistemic 
disjunctivism but he thinks that to do so he has to endorse perceptual disjunctivism as 
well and this is why he expresses his commitment to perceptual disjunctivism and 
then talks as if he has thereby committed himself to epistemic disjunctivism. The 
commentators mentioned, then, are wrong to think that an equivocation in 
McDowell’s language should lead us to think that he doesn’t really endorse perceptual 
disjunctivism.  
Of course the reading of McDowell that I have just offered requires that we ascribe 
to him the thesis that there is an intimate connection between epistemic disjunctivism 
and perceptual disjunctivism: it requires us to say that McDowell thinks that the only 
way to get epistemic disjunctivism to work is if one also adopts perceptual 
disjunctivism. But I noted above that there is no obvious connection between the two 
kinds of disjunctivism: it seems possible to be a perceptual disjunctivist without being 
                                                 
22 For example in his (1982), pp.385-387 he presents what looks like perceptual disjunctivism as a 
response to what looks like the argument from hallucination but then throughout the rest of the paper 
talks as if he has thereby established epistemic disjunctivism.  
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an epistemic disjunctivist and vice-versa. Whilst it is not obvious that there is a 
connection between these views I think that McDowell thinks that there is, as I have 
made clear. A consequence of this is that it enables us to extract an epistemological 
argument for disjunctivism from McDowell’s work, an argument which purports to 
infer perceptual disjunctivism from epistemic disjunctivism. I want to say more about 
the structure of that argument in the next section. In the following chapters I will try 
to defend and develop it.  
 
 
 
5. 
 
My defence of the claim that McDowell endorses perceptual disjunctivism resulted 
in the ascription of an epistemological argument for perceptual disjunctivism to him 
and it is this argument that is the subject matter of the rest of this essay. In this final 
section I want to clarify the argument’s structure. 
Epistemic disjunctivism says that perceptions and hallucinations differ with respect 
to what reasons they provide their subjects with to make judgements about the states 
of the world they present to those subjects. Perceptions provide their subjects with 
better reasons to make judgements about the world than do hallucinations and this 
explains why they put their subjects in a position to know things about the world even 
though hallucinations don’t, assuming that there is such a link between perceptual 
knowledge and perceptual reasons. Perceptual disjunctivism says that perceptions and 
hallucinations differ with respect to their fundamental nature: perceptions have mind-
independent states of the world as constituents whereas hallucinations don’t. What is 
the structure of the argument that moves from the former thesis to the latter that 
McDowell puts forward? 
 I think the argument goes like this. McDowell’s argument starts from the claim 
that perceptions of a burning weeping willow put us in a position to know that there is 
a burning weeping willow even though hallucinatory experiences as of a burning 
weeping willow fail to put us in a position to know that there is a burning weeping 
willow. Let’s call this the anti-sceptical claim since it involves the anti-sceptical 
thesis that perceptions put us in a position to know things.  
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What explains why the anti-sceptical claim is true? One thing that seems like it 
could explain why the anti-sceptical claim is true is that whenever one has a 
hallucination of a burning weeping willow it is false that there is a burning weeping 
willow whereas whenever one genuinely perceives a burning weeping willow it is true 
that there is a burning weeping willow. If this were true then it would explain why 
hallucinations don’t put us in a position to know things even though perceptions do, 
because to be in a position to know that there is a burning weeping willow it has to be 
true that there is a burning weeping willow. Unfortunately it is not possible to explain 
the truth of the ant-sceptical claim in this way because it is simply not true that 
whenever one has a hallucinatory experience as of a burning weeping willow it is 
false that there is a burning weeping willow: one can have an hallucinatory experience 
of an object even if that object actually exists.  
What else could explain why the anti-sceptical claim is true? Another way of 
explaining its truth could be provided by a certain way of conceiving of how 
perceptual experience puts us in a position to know things. According to the way in 
question a perception puts us in a position to know that p – where ‘p’ is some relevant 
piece of information about the mind-independent object that we perceive – by 
providing us with good reasons to judge that p. Another way of presenting this 
conception of how perception enables us to know things is as the view that perception 
doesn’t count as a way of knowing that p just because it is capable of explaining why 
one knows that p, but because the explanation it makes available of why one knows 
that p involves considerations which function as one’s reason to believe that p and so 
is a kind of rational explanation: that S perceives that p enables S to know that p 
because the claim ‘because S perceives that p’ could be given as way of explaining in 
a satisfactory way from the standpoint of rationality why S knows that p23.  
How does this reasons-based conception of perceptual knowledge lead us to an 
explanation of the truth of the anti-sceptical claim? The anti-sceptical claim says that 
perceptions put us in a position to know things about the world even though 
phenomenally indistinguishable hallucinations don’t. The reasons-based approach to 
perceptual knowledge just described says that perceptions put us in a position to know 
things because they provide us with good reasons to make the very judgements that 
constitute the knowledge they enable us to possess. It seems clear that this last claim 
                                                 
23 See Cassam (2007) for a discussion of what it is for Φing that p to count as a way of knowing that p. 
Cassam doesn’t consider the reasons-based account of ways of knowing that I’ve just sketched.  
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is only capable of explaining the first if it is also the case that perfect hallucinations 
don’t provide us with good reasons to make the judgements which would constitute 
knowledge were we to make them on the basis of genuine perceptions. So the 
reasons-based conception of perceptual knowledge constitutes an explanation of the 
anti-sceptical claim when we marry it to the claim that from ‘S perceives that p’ we 
can infer ‘S has good reason to believe that p’ even though we cannot infer it from ‘S 
suffers a hallucination as of p’ and this is so even though perceptions of p are 
phenomenally indistinguishable from hallucinations as of p. It should be clear by now 
that what is being suggested here is that given the correctness of the reasons-based 
approach to perceptual knowledge what explains why the anti-sceptical claim is true 
is that epistemic disjunctivism is true.  
This is exactly how the inference from the anti-sceptical claim to epistemic 
disjunctivism is structured. The first part of McDowell’s epistemic argument for 
perceptual disjunctivism says, then, that what explains why perceptions enable us to 
know that p even though phenomenally indistinguishable hallucinations don’t is that 
necessarily, perceptions provide us with different reasons to believe that p than 
hallucinations. The first part of McDowell’s epistemic argument constitutes a 
transition from the anti-sceptical claim to epistemic disjunctivism and it represents the 
truth of the latter both as a necessary condition of the truth of the former, as well as 
providing an explanation of the truth of the former. 
But now we might ask what explains why perceptions provide us with better 
reasons than phenomenally indistinguishable hallucinations? The second part of 
McDowell’s epistemic argument for perceptual disjunctivism says that what explains 
why a perception of an O which is F provides one with a better reason to judge that 
there is an O which is F than a mere perfect hallucination as of an O which is F is that 
necessarily, one’s perception has the O and its Fness themselves as constituents and is 
hence a different kind of experiential state than one’s perfect hallucination as of an O 
which is F, which doesn’t have the O and its Fness themselves as constituents. The 
second part of McDowell’s epistemic argument for perceptual disjunctivism consists 
in a transition from the truth of epistemic disjunctivism to the truth of perceptual 
disjunctivism and it represents perceptual disjunctivism both as a necessary condition 
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of the truth of epistemic disjunctivism, as well as providing an explanation of its 
truth24.  
That’s the schematic version of McDowell’s epistemic argument for perceptual 
disjunctivism. It is an argument which starts with the claim that perceptions and 
hallucinations put one in differing positions to know things, and then infers from this 
that they differ with respect to what reasons they provide us with, and finally draws 
from this the conclusion that they constitute fundamentally different kinds of 
experience because perceptions of the states of the world they provide us with reasons 
to believe things about have those states of the world as constituents whereas 
hallucinations don’t. I’ve outlined the structure of the argument but it is not obvious 
how it could be got to work: how should we understand the claim that perceptions 
provide us with better reasons than hallucinations? And is it really the case that 
perceptual disjunctivism needs to be endorsed in order for epistemic disjunctivism to 
be viable? In the next chapter I will outline McDowell’s own version of the epistemic 
argument which will provide an answer to these questions.  
 
 
                                                 
24 Note that to say that p provides an explanation of q us not to say that p is sufficient for the truth of q. 
‘That the rock was thrown at it’ provides an explanation of why the window is broken but it is not 
sufficient for the truth of that claim, for example. I want to point this out because I want to make it 
clear that the epistemic argument for perceptual disjunctivism says that epistemic disjunctivism is a 
necessary condition of the truth of the anti-sceptical claim and explains why it is true but does not say 
that epistemic disjunctivism is sufficient for the truth of the anti-sceptical claim: it leaves it open that 
even though perceptions provide one with better reasons than hallucinations that doesn’t guarantee that 
perceptions put us in a position to know things about the world whereas hallucinations don’t, even 
though it might explain that fact. Likewise for what the epistemic argument says about the relation 
between epistemic disjunctivism and perceptual disjunctivism: it does not say that perceptual 
disjunctivism is sufficient for the truth of epistemic disjunctivism, even though it is necessary for it’s 
truth and also explains why it’s true, if it is.  
31 
 
 
II 
 
A Version of the Epistemic Argument for 
Perceptual Disjunctivism 
 
 
 
 
 
We saw in the last chapter that an epistemic argument for perceptual disjunctivism 
can be extracted from McDowell’s writings on the matter. The first part of the 
epistemic argument says that what explains why our perceptions put us in a position 
to know things about the objects they present us with even though indistinguishable 
hallucinations don’t is that they give us better reasons to make judgements about 
those objects than hallucinations. The second part of the argument says that what 
explains this, in turn, is that perceptions have the very states of the world they provide 
us with reasons to make judgments about as constituents whereas phenomenally 
indistinguishable hallucinations don’t. In this chapter I want to present McDowell’s 
version of this argument. I’ll argue that there are a number of objections which can be 
made against this version of the argument, some of which seem fatal.  
 
 
 
1.  
 
I’ll begin with what McDowell’s version of the epistemic argument says about the 
first part of the argument: the transition from the anti-sceptical claim to epistemic 
disjunctivism. This part of the argument says that what explains why perception puts 
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us in a position to know that p even though a phenomenally indistinguishable 
hallucination doesn’t is that it is a condition of perception putting us in a position to 
know that p that it provides us with different or better reasons to judge that p than a 
phenomenally indistinguishable hallucination. So even though I can’t tell apart my 
perception of a lemon tree in front of me from a perfect hallucination as of a lemon 
tree in front of me necessarily, my perception provides me with better reason to judge 
that there is a lemon tree in front of me than my hallucination and this is why my 
perception affords me an opportunity for knowledge that there’s a lemon tree in front 
of me even though my hallucination doesn’t. How does this inference work according 
to McDowell’s version of the argument?  
McDowell accepts the idea that in order for perception of a lemon tree in front of 
one to put one in a position to know that there is a lemon tree in front of one it must 
be the case that one’s perception provides one with good evidence or a good reason to 
judge that there is a lemon tree in front of one: McDowell endorses the reasons-based 
account of perceptual knowledge I sketched at the end of the previous chapter25. But 
he also thinks that for one’s perception of a lemon tree in front of one is to put one in 
a position to know that there is a lemon tree in front of one it must provide one not 
just with any kind of good evidence in favour of that judgement, but with indefeasible 
evidence for that judgement. This, I take it, is how McDowell understands the notion 
of good perceptual evidence for a proposition describing the external objects and 
properties a given perception presents one with: indefeasible evidence that one’s 
perceptual experience of those objects and properties enables one to possess.  
For McDowell an article of evidence, E, counts as an indefeasible reason to judge 
that p just in case the possession of E is inconsistent with the falsehood of p26. For 
example the fact that there are five apples in the fridge provides me with indefeasible 
evidence for the judgement that there are fewer than six apples in the fridge, and the 
fact that Evie is standing in front of me provides me with indefeasible evidence for 
the judgement that there is someone standing in front of me. Whenever I refer to an 
article of evidence or a reason as ‘indefeasible’ I’ll be using the word in this sense. E 
counts as defeasible evidence to believe that p for McDowell, by contrast, if the 
possession of it is consistent with the falsehood of p. For example the fact that two 
individuals share a similar set of genes provides me with defeasible evidence to 
                                                 
25 See, for example, McDowell (1995), p.395 
26 McDowell (1982), 370-371.  
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believe that they are related, and the fact that the branches of the tree outside are 
shaking provides me with defeasible evidence to judge that it is windy. Whenever I 
refer to an article of evidence ‘defeasible’ I’ll be using the word in this sense.  
So McDowell thinks that what explains why my perception of a lemon tree in front 
of me enables me to know that there is a lemon tree in front of me is that it provides 
me with reason in favour of the judgement that there is a lemon tree in front of me 
that’s inconsistent with the falsehood of that judgement: my perceptions provide me 
with indefeasible evidence. But why does McDowell think that perceptions of an O 
which is F have to provide one with indefeasible as opposed to defeasible reasons for 
believing that there is an O which is F if they are to put their subjects in a position to 
know that there is an O which is F?  
I think that this is because he thinks that if perceptions were to provide one with 
defeasible reasons for believing that p – where ‘p’ is a proposition describes the 
external objects and properties one’s perception presents one with – then perceptual 
experience would not be able to afford us opportunities for knowledge that p without 
the aid of background knowledge which linked one’s perception or perhaps the 
content thereof to the truth of ‘p’ – knowledge, for example, that the existence of our 
perceptual experiences indicate that ‘p’ is true – and this is not, intuitively, the correct 
picture of how perceptual knowledge works27.   
When I perceive a lemon tree in front of me I can know that there is a lemon tree in 
front of me without having to know that if I have an experience of a lemon tree in 
front of me then it is probable that there is a lemon tree in front of me, for example. 
When I perceive a lemon tree in front of me I am simply in a position to know that 
there is a lemon tree in front of me without the aid of any background knowledge 
concerning the relation between my experiences of a lemon tree and the fact that there 
is a lemon tree in front of me. McDowell thinks that this implies that my perception of 
a lemon tree needs to provide me with indefeasible reasons to believe that there is a 
lemon tree in front of me: if a knowledge source provides one with only defeasible 
evidence for the belief that p then it must rely on the subject’s background knowledge 
if it to provide one with evidence in favour of p for the subject and since perception is 
a knowledge source that doesn’t rely on the subject’s background knowledge in order 
                                                 
27 Ibid, p.373 
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to function as evidence for the belief that p it must provide the subject with an 
indefeasible reason to believe that p.  
So McDowell wants to say that perceptions provide their subjects with indefeasible 
reasons to believe that p and that this is what explains why they put us in a position to 
know that p. But what exactly is the indefeasible reason in favour of believing that 
there is a lemon tree in front of one that one’s sighting of a lemon tree provides one 
with? Consider what McDowell says in the following passage:  
 
Seeing, or perhaps having seen, that things are thus and so would be 
an epistemically satisfactory standing in the space of reasons.28 
 
So sticking with the visual case McDowell wants to say that one’s indefeasible 
reason for believing that p that one’s perceptual experience provides one with is that 
one sees that p, and that one sees that p genuinely counts as an indefeasible reason to 
believe that p because from ‘S sees that p’ we can validly infer ‘p’: seeing that p is a 
factive state, a state which one can be in only if ‘p’ is true.  
In claiming that one’s sighting of a lemon tree in front of one provides one with the 
indefeasible reason that one sees that there is a lemon tree in front of one to believe 
that there is a lemon tree in front of one McDowell is making a significant assumption 
about the nature of perceptual reasons. The assumption is that perceptions provide 
their subjects with reasons to believe that p partly by constituting a fact – that one sees 
that p, say – that can in turn constitute the sole premise of a valid deductive inference 
which has ‘p’ as its conclusion. Perceptions provide their subjects with reasons, then, 
in the same way that rainfall provides one with a reason to believe that it is raining: 
rainfall provides one with reason to believe that it is raining because it constitutes the 
fact that it is raining and this can, trivially, constitute the sole premise in a deductive 
inference to the claim that it is raining. Similarly, one’s sighting of a lemon tree in 
front of one provides one with a reason to believe that there is a lemon tree in front of 
one because it constitutes the fact that one sees that there is a lemon tree in front of 
one and this can in turn constitute the sole premise in a valid deductive inference to 
the conclusion that there is a lemon tree in front of one.  
                                                 
28 McDowell (1995), pp.396 
35 
That this premise-constituting conception of perceptual reasons is correct is an 
assumption of some significance and I’ll be coming back to it later29. It seems to me 
to be the product of two ideas. The first idea is the inferentialist conception of reason-
hood which says roughly that something can be a reason for believing that p if and 
only if one can infer p from it: only if it can constitute the premise in an argument for 
p30. The second idea is that the correct way to understand how perceptions provide 
their subjects with reasons to believe that p is by constituting the reason itself: 
perceptual experiences themselves just are the reasons they provide their subjects 
with to believe that p. If we combine these two ideas we get the premise constituting 
conception of perceptual reasons that McDowell commits himself to when he says 
that in cases of visual perception that one sees that p constitutes one’s reason to 
believe that p. 
I do not want to dwell on the premise-constituting conception of perceptual reasons 
at the moment. It will come up again in chapter three. In the remainder of this section 
I want to describe how McDowell uses the claim that perceptions provide their 
subjects with indefeasible reasons to believe that p of the form that one perceives that 
p in the first part of his version of the epistemic argument. 
McDowell wants to say that what explains why perception puts me in a position to 
know that p is that it is a necessary condition of my perceptions putting me in a 
position to know that p that they provide me with the indefeasible reason that one 
perceives that p to believe that p. But if this is the correct picture of the way 
perceptual knowledge works then, McDowell wants to say, what explains why I can’t 
know that p on the basis of a given hallucinatory experience is that my hallucinatory 
experience fails to constitute an indefeasible reason of this form to believe that p. This 
is because that one perceives that p is trivially not a condition that obtains when one 
suffers a visual hallucinatory experience phenomenally indistinguishable from the 
visual perceptual experience one enjoys when one’s experience gives one the 
indefeasible reason that one perceives that p. Indeed it is difficult to see how 
hallucinatory experiences could provide one with indefeasible reasons to believe that 
                                                 
29 The Premise constituting conception of perceptual reasons seems to me to be tacitly assumed by 
many philosophers of perception working within the internalist tradition. The most prominent is 
BonJour (1985; 2002).  
30 Pryor (2005) calls this claim the ‘premise principle’, rejects it and thus the premise constituting 
conception of perceptual reasons along with it.  
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p in any sense given that one could undergo such a hallucinatory experience even if p 
were false.  
But if what explains why perceptions put me in a position to know that p is that 
they provide me with indefeasible evidence that one perceives that p and what 
explains why hallucinations don’t put me in a position to know that p is that they fail 
to provide me with such indefeasible evidence then what explains why perceptions 
and hallucinations put me in differing positions to know things about the world is that 
perceptions and hallucinations provide me with different reasons to believe things 
about the world even though they might well be phenomenally indistinguishable: 
what explains why the anti-sceptical claim is true is that epistemic disjunctivism is 
true. This is how the first part of McDowell’s version of the epistemic argument runs.  
 
 
 
2.  
 
I have presented the first part of McDowell’s version of the epistemic argument. In 
this section I want to present the second part of McDowell’s version of the argument.  
We have seen that so far McDowell wants to say that perceptions and 
hallucinations provide us with different reasons to believe that p because visual 
perceptions, for example, provide us with the indefeasible reason that one sees that p 
to believe that p whereas hallucinations don’t. We have also seen that McDowell 
wants to say that sightings provide us with such reasons partly by constituting them: 
my sighting of a lemon tree constitutes the fact that I see that there is a lemon tree in 
front of me, and this is part of what explains how my sighting can provide me with 
such reasons. 
But just because one’s visual experience constitutes the fact that one sees that p it 
doesn’t follow that that fact can function as a reason for one: it doesn’t follow that one 
counts as possessing that reasons. It might seem plausible to think that one must have 
reflective knowledge that one sees that p in order for seeing to function as one’s 
reason for believing that p: one must be capable of knowing by reflection on one’s 
current state that one sees that p if the claim that one sees that p is to function as a 
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reason to believe that p31. This claim seems plausible in the light of the plausibility of 
the more general claim that one needs to have reflective knowledge of the 
considerations that constitute one’s reasons to believe that p if they are to constitute 
one’s reasons for belief at all32. If we assume that one must have reflective knowledge 
of the claims that constitute one’s reason for believing that p then we get the result 
that in order for one’s visual experience to put one in possession of the indefeasible 
reason it constitutes, from ‘S is having a visual perception of a lemon tree in front of 
her’, for example, we must be able to validly infer ‘S is capable of knowing by 
reflection that she sees that there is a lemon tree in front of her’.  
In order for one’s visual experience of a lemon tree in front of one to provide one 
with the indefeasible reason that one sees that there is a lemon tree in front of one it 
not only must constitute that fact but it also must put one in a position to know it by 
reflection. But how can it be the case that one’s visual perception of a lemon tree is 
sufficient for the reflective knowability of the claim that one sees that there is a lemon 
tree in front of one?  
I think that McDowell explains how this can be so by making a significant 
assumption about the epistemological status of our experiential states. The assumption 
is that for any perception of a mind-independent object if one enjoys such a perceptual 
state, one is capable of knowing by reflection that one is enjoying that perceptual 
state. This assumption could be justified by the claim that for any psychological or 
mental state if one is in that state then one is in a position to know by reflection that 
one is in that state in conjunction with the claim that perceptual states are 
psychological states33. Since the subject’s visual perception of a lemon tree constitutes 
the fact that she sees that there is a lemon tree in front of her it follows from the 
assumption about the epistemological status of out perceptual states that one’s visual 
                                                 
31 Or at least have a justified belief that one sees that p. To keep things simple I’ll stick solely with the 
claim that one needs to know that one sees that p in order for the claim that one sees that p to function 
as a reason to believe that p. This shouldn’t lead one to think that I think that the claim couldn’t 
function as one’s reason to believe that p when one has a mere justified belief in it however.  
32 Again, many epistemologists working within the internalist tradition support this claim. BonJour 
(1985; 2002) provides the paradigm case of a philosopher who endorses this claim. McDowell seems to 
endorse it. See his (1982), pp.390-391; (1994), p.418; (1995), pp.403; and (2002), pp.100-101. Neta & 
Pritchard (2007) as well as Pritchard (2008) ascribe the thesis to him as well.  
33 This is a version of a thesis which Williamson (2000), ch.4 labels the ‘luminosity’ thesis and is a 
very familiar thesis about the epistemology of the mental. When the luminosity thesis is conjoined with 
the thesis that for any mental state, if one is not in that state then one is in a position to know by 
reflection that one is not in that state we get a version of what Williamson calls the ‘transparency’ 
thesis which says that for any mental state one is able to tell by reflection whether one is in that state or 
whether one is not in that state. The transparency thesis expresses the thought that we are infallible 
about the goings on in our own minds.  
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perception of a lemon tree in front of one is sufficient for the knowability by 
reflection of the fact that one sees that there is a lemon tree in front of one. This is 
how McDowell shows that one’s visual perception of a lemon tree in front of one 
provides one with the reason that one sees that there is a lemon tree in front of one to 
believe that there is a lemon tree in front of one: it does so because it constitutes that 
fact and because it is it is knowable by reflection.  
Now, in explaining how one’s visual perception of a lemon tree in front of one is 
sufficient for one to possess the reason that one sees that there is a lemon tree in front 
of one McDowell has drawn on two claims. The first is that one’s visual perception of 
a lemon tree constitutes the fact that one sees that there is a lemon tree in front of one. 
The second is that for any perceptual state directed towards a mind-independent 
object if one enjoys such a perceptual state, one is capable of knowing by reflection 
that one is enjoying that perceptual state. According to the second part of McDowell’s 
version of the epistemic argument for perceptual disjunctivism it follows from these 
assumptions that perceptual disjunctivism is true.  
The second assumption effectively states that we can have reflective knowledge of 
the perceptual states that we are in. Now as we have seen, if our perceptions are the 
same kind of experiential state as hallucinations then they are different from 
hallucinations only because they require the existence of their mind-independent 
objects and have some extrinsic property which relates them to such objects such that 
they can count as perceptions of those objects, such as the property of being caused by 
those objects. But it is not clear that we can know by reflection that we are in states of 
this kind: surely we cannot know by reflection, for example, that the experiential state 
we are in when he undergo a perception is caused by its object. It follows, then, that if 
our perceptual states are the same kind of experiential state as hallucinations then we 
can’t know that we are in them by reflection. Hence, if the second assumption 
McDowell makes to explain how it is that one can know that one perceives that p 
holds, perceptions and hallucinations must be of difference experiential kinds: they 
must differ with respect to some of their intrinsic properties and not just their non-
intrinsic properties.  
The first assumption that McDowell makes says that our perceptual states constitute 
the indefeasible reason that one perceives that p to believe that p that they provide us 
with. Now, it cannot be the case that one perceives that p unless it is also the case that 
p, as we have seen. This implies that the perceptual state which constitutes the fact 
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that one perceives that p cannot be a state that we can be in unless p is true. But we 
have seen that it seems to follow from the second assumption that our perceptual 
states must be constituted by experiential states that are different in kind from 
hallucinatory states and cannot be constituted by states that are the same in kind 
experientially as hallucinatory states but which are distinguished from them by their 
non-intrinsic properties, like for example their causal origins. So it follows from both 
assumptions together that the perceptual state that constitutes the fact that one 
perceives that p must be identical to an experiential state different in kind from a 
hallucinatory state and which can be enjoyed only if p is true.  
But it seems that the only way to accommodate this consequence of the two 
assumptions is to say that the state of the world which constitutes p is a constituent of 
the experiential state different in kind from a hallucinatory state which makes up the 
perceptual state that constitutes the fact that one perceives that p. In other words, the 
only way to accommodate the consequence of the two assumptions just described is to 
say that the perceptual state that provides one with the indefeasible reason that one 
perceives that p by constituting that fact must be different in kind experientially from 
a hallucinatory experience because it has the state of the world which constitutes the 
fact that p as a constituent, and this is just what the perceptual disjunctivism suggests. 
This is McDowell’s way of getting the inference from epistemic disjunctivism to 
perceptual disjunctivism to work. One’s visual perception of a lemon tree provides 
one with the indefeasible reason that one sees that there is a lemon tree in front of one 
to believe that there is a lemon tree in front of one whereas a visual hallucination as of 
a lemon tree in front of one doesn’t. Our visual perception enables us to possess this 
reason because it constitutes the fact that one sees that there is a lemon tree in front of 
one and our perceptions enable us to know this indefeasible reason by reflection, as 
must be the case if we are to count as possessing it. One’s visual state enables one to 
know by reflection that one sees that there is a lemon tree in front of one because it is 
itself knowable by reflection and it constitutes the fact that one sees that there is a 
lemon tree in front of one. Because it constitutes the fact that one sees that there is a 
lemon tree in front of one and this fact cannot obtain unless there is a lemon tree in 
front of one, one’s visual state must be a state one can be in only if there really is a 
lemon tree in front of one. But if one’s visual perception of a lemon tree in front of 
one is to be knowable to one by reflection then it cannot be an experiential state the 
same in kind as hallucination but which differs from hallucination with respect to 
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some of its extrinsic properties, such as its causal properties. It follows that one’s 
visual perception of a lemon tree in front of one must be an experiential state different 
in kind from a hallucination as of a lemon tree in front of one that one can be in only 
if there really is a lemon tree in front of one. But the only way this can be the case is if 
one’s visual perception of a lemon tree in front of one is an experiential state that has 
the lemon tree in front of one itself as a constituent and this is why it is different in 
kind from a hallucinatory state as of a lemon tree in front of one, as the perceptual 
disjunctivist suggests. This is McDowell’s version of the second part of the epistemic 
arguments.  
 
 
 
3.  
 
In the first section I presented McDowell’s version of the first part of the epistemic 
argument for perceptual disjunctivism. In the second section I presented McDowell’s 
version of the second part of the epistemic argument for perceptual disjunctivism. 
Putting McDowell’s version of each part of the argument together we get an argument 
that works overall as follows.  
Perceptions put us in a position to know that p – where ‘p’ is some relevant 
proposition about the objects and properties of those objects presented to us by our 
perceptions – whereas hallucinations don’t. What explains why perceptions put us in a 
position to know that p whereas hallucinations don’t is that perceptions provide us 
with the indefeasible reason to believe that p that one perceives that p whereas 
hallucinations don’t. Perceptions and hallucinations, even though they can be 
phenomenally indistinguishable from one another provide us with different reasons to 
believe things about the world. Since that fact has to be reflectively accessible to one 
if it is to function as one’s reason the perception that one has which constitutes it must 
be itself knowable by reflection. But one’s perception can be knowable by reflection 
only if they are constituted by experiential states different in kind from those which 
we suffer when we undergo hallucinations. But since one’s perceptions constitute the 
indefeasible reason that one perceives that p to believe that p and the existence of that 
reason entails that p is true perceptions must be constituted by experiential states that 
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one can enjoy only if p is true. This implies that the experiential states that constitutes 
the perception which one has which in turn constitutes the indefeasible reason that 
one perceives that p must have the states of the world that constitute p as constituents 
and hence are for that reason different kinds of experiential states from hallucinations, 
as the perceptual disjunctivist suggests.  
I’ll call this McDowellian version of epistemic argument for perceptual 
disjunctivism the reflective knowledge argument. In the remainder of this chapter I 
want to argue that it doesn’t work.  
 
 
 
4.  
 
In this section I want to consider an objection to the second part of McDowell’s 
reflective knowledge argument that I think McDowell can meet. The objection is that 
the reflective knowledge argument, with it’s insistence on the claim that one can 
know by reflection that one is in the experiential state constitutive of perception in 
conjunction with it’s insistence on the idea that one can only be in such a state if some 
proposition about the world p knowable on the basis of that experience is true, runs 
into a version of the well-known problem Michael McKinsey (1991; 2007) presented 
for externalist theories of mental content34. I’ll call the objection the McKinsey 
objection.  
The problem, McKinsey thinks, is that externalist theories of mental content which 
say that one is in a position to know by reflection that one is enjoying a mental state 
that has a content which is supervenient on the state of one’s environment have to say 
that one is able to have knowledge by reflection of the facts about the world on which 
the content of the mental state in question supervenes. This is supposed to be a 
problem because intuitively it is simply not the case that we can come to know facts 
about the world by reflection. According to the second objection to McDowell’s 
reflective knowledge argument McDowell’s commitment to the claim that we can 
know by reflection the indefeasible reason that one perceives that p runs him into the 
very same problem that McKinsey thinks the content externalist runs into.  
                                                 
34 Neta & Pritchard (2007), pp.389-390 point out that McDowell runs into a version of this problem. 
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The problem for McDowell can be presented as follows. McDowell says that if S is 
in the experiential state that constitutes her perception that p then S is in a position to 
know by reflection that she perceives that p. But perceiving that p is a factive state: if 
S perceives that p then p is true. So let’s assume that S undergoes a visual perception 
of a lemon tree in front of her which constitutes the fact that she sees that there is a 
lemon tree in front of her. By McDowell’s reckoning we can infer that S is in a 
position to know by reflection that she sees that there is a lemon tree in front of her. 
But assuming that S is reasonably intellectually sophisticated she will be capable of 
knowing by reflection that if she sees that there is a lemon tree in front of her then 
there is a lemon tree in front of her. If we assume that knowledge is closed under 
known entailment however then it follows immediately that S can know by reflection 
that there is a lemon tree in front of her: she can know a fact about the world by 
reflection. But as McKinsey protests it is surely false that one can know by reflection 
that a certain proposition about the world is true.  
So it seems that the reflective knowledge argument if sound has the consequence 
that we can know by reflection that certain facts about the world obtain and this is 
counter-intuitive. As Pritchard and Neta (2007) point out however there is a way for 
McDowell to respond to the McKinsey objection and thus defend his argument35.  
They start by noting the following. To know that p by reflection for McDowell is to 
have a belief that p that’s based on one’s reflectively known indefeasible perceptual 
reason to believe that p. One’s reflectively known indefeasible perceptual reason to 
believe that p is that one perceives that p. To base one’s belief that p on this 
indefeasible reason is just to infer p from it. So as long as one infers p from the 
reflectively known proposition that one perceives that p one counts as having 
perceptual knowledge for McDowell. But in the supposedly problematic cases in 
which one comes to know that p by reflection by inferring it from the claim that one 
perceives that p, also known by reflection, this is precisely what occurs: one infers p 
from one’s reflectively known indefeasible reason that one perceives that p. Hence in 
cases in which one comes to know that p by reflection by inferring it from one’s 
reflective knowledge that one perceives that p one also comes to know that p by 
perception as well for McDowell.  
                                                 
35 Ibid, pp.391-394 
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How does this help with the problem we’re now considering? The problem is that it 
is a consequence of McDowell’s reflective access argument that one can know facts 
about the world by reflection. Pritchard and Neta’s claim is basically that it is a 
consequence of McDowell’s reflective access argument that one can know that p by 
reflection but only when one also knows that p by perception: it is a consequence of 
McDowell’s reflective access argument that being in a position to know that p by 
perception comes along with being in a position to know it by reflection. But this 
claim surely doesn’t help with the problem because it says that it really does follow 
from McDowell’s reflective access argument that one can know things about the 
world by reflection; why does it help with the problem to say that it follows from 
McDowell’s argument that one can know things about the world by reflection only 
when one also knows them by perception?  
The answer is that it doesn’t seem anywhere near as problematic to say that facts 
about the world are knowable by reflection only when they are also knowable by 
perception than it does to say that facts about the world are knowable by reflection 
alone. If it were a consequence of McDowell’s account that we can know things about 
the world by reflection alone then that would be a problem for McDowell because it is 
surely counter-intuitive to say that we can come to know things about the world 
simply by sitting down and reflecting. But if it is a consequence of McDowell’s 
account that we can know things about the world by reflection only when we also 
know those things by perception that doesn’t seem so counter-intuitive because in far 
as his account has the consequence just described he doesn’t have to countenance the 
possibility of an agent coming to know things about the world just by sitting down 
and reflecting. So McDowell can respond to the objection that his reflective access 
argument leads him to be committed to the claim that one can know things about the 
world by reflection as follows: the claim that one can know things about the world by 
reflection is only implausible if it is read as the claim that one can know things about 
the world by reflection alone, but my account doesn’t have that consequence, instead 
it has the consequence that one can know things about the world by reflection only 
when one also knows them by perception, so my account fails to have any 
problematic claim as a consequence.   
So the McKinsey objection to McDowell’s reflective access argument is not 
effective. In the following sections I turn to an objection put forward by Wright 
(2002; 2008) which is fatal to McDowell’s argument, or so I will try to show.  
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5.  
 
In the previous section I showed, following Pritchard and Neta, how McDowell can 
meet the McKinsey objection. In this section I want to point out that McDowell’s 
reflective knowledge argument carries with it commitments which lead McDowell to 
be committed to a distinctive conception of what it is to know that one is undergoing 
an experiential state by reflection. This conception will need to be articulated more 
fully and defended by McDowell if his reflective knowledge argument is to be 
acceptable. I’ll call this issue with McDowell’s argument the phenomenal 
indistinguishability issue.  
The claim that’s key to McDowell’s derivation of perceptual disjunctivism from his 
version of epistemic disjunctivism is that if one has a perception of a mind-
independent object then one is in a position to know by reflection that one has a 
perception of a mind-independent object. There is an obvious problem with this claim 
however: given the phenomenal indistinguishability of the experiential state that 
constitutes one’s perception of an O which is F and the experiential state one is in 
when one suffers a hallucination as of an O which is F doesn’t it straightforwardly 
follow that one cannot know by reflection that one is in former sort of experiential 
state when one is, even if they are different in kind? 
The claim that the phenomenal indistinguishability of perceptual states and 
hallucinatory states implies that one cannot know by reflection that one is in either is 
one way of motivating the key premise of the epistemic analogue of the argument 
from hallucination that I discussed in the previous chapter. According to the premise 
in question the phenomenal indistinguishability of perceptual and hallucinatory 
experiential states implies that they must provide the subjects with the same reasons 
to believe things about the world. If the phenomenal indistinguishability of the two 
states implies that one is not in a position to know by reflection that one is in the 
experiential state constitutive of perception when one is and if it is assumed that one 
must be able to know that one is in such an experiential state by reflection in order for 
perception to provide one with different reasons to believe things about the world than 
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hallucination as McDowell suggests, then the key premise of the epistemic analogue 
of the argument from hallucination follows.  
If McDowell is to meet the objection to the reflective knowledge argument just 
sketched then he will have to find some way of showing that one can know by 
reflection that one is in the experiential state he thinks constitutes perception of a 
mind-independent object when one is even though that state is phenomenally 
indistinguishable from a hallucination as of the same object. That is, if McDowell is 
to defend his argument he will have to find some way of saying that even though 
perceptions and hallucinations are phenomenally indistinguishable it doesn’t follow 
that one cannot know by reflection that one perceives when one does: reflective 
knowledge of one’s own perceptual states is not knowledge based on the 
phenomenology of those states36. If McDowell’s perceptual knowledge argument is to 
be acceptable he needs to develop and defend this account. This is the phenomenal 
indistinguishability issue.  
 
 
 
6.  
 
So far we have seen that McDowell can defend himself against the McKinsey 
objection and that his argument isn’t acceptable until he’s addressed the phenomenal 
indistinguishability issue. In this I want to present another objection with the 
reflective knowledge argument. I’ll call this objection the knowledge of perception 
objection.  
We have seen that according to the reflective knowledge argument it is one’s 
reflective knowledge of one’s own experiential state – reflective knowledge that one 
perceives that p – which constitutes one’s possession of a perceptual reason to believe 
that p. The reflective knowledge argument has it, in other words, that perceptual 
knowledge is mediated by knowledge of one’s own experiential states: it is mediated 
by one’s reflective knowledge that one perceives that p.  
                                                 
36 See Martin (2006), part II for a discussion of how a disjunctivist might say that one is in a position to 
know that one is in a given perceptual state even though that state is phenomenally indistinguishable 
from a hallucinatory state. 
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I think that there is a sense in which the idea that perceptual knowledge is 
cognitively mediated in such a way over-intellectualises perceptual knowledge. Surely 
there are cases in which a subject experiences an O which is F and then is in a 
position to know that there is an O which is F without having to be in a position to 
know that she perceives that there is an O which is F? It seems that there are even 
cases in which subjects seem to be able to possess perceptual reasons and hence 
perceptual knowledge even when they are not capable of forming any beliefs about 
their own perceptual experiences at all. Consider the following case:  
 
Planet of the Blind. Grace lives on a planet inhabited solely by 
people who have been blind since birth. There is no one on Grace’s 
planet who has a sense of sight. Consequently no one on Grace’s 
planet possesses the concept vision, sight, seeing, or any other 
concept of visual perception. One day Grace undergoes surgery on 
her the area of her brain response for visual perception. She awakes 
from her anaesthetic and, as a side effect of the surgery, has been 
cured of her blindness: she now has visual perceptions of mind-
independent objects as rich and as our own. Because Grace does not 
possess any concepts of visual perception she has no conception of 
what is happening to her. Consequentially she is unable to form any 
judgements which employ any such concepts. She looks out the 
window and sees a lemon tree outside. She possesses the concept of 
a lemon tree and is able to recognise it using her new powers of 
vision. Her visual experience of a lemon tree outside provides her 
with a good reason to judge that there is a lemon tree outside and 
thereby puts her in a position to know that there is a lemon tree 
outside.  
 
If a case like that of Grace’s is possible then one’s perceptual experience can 
provide one with good reason to believe that p and hence can put one in a position to 
know that p without one having to possess any article of knowledge about one’s 
perceptual states, including one reflective knowledge that one perceives that p. This is 
because the case of Grace in Planet of the Blind, if possible, and if cases of the same 
structure can be constructed for other modes of perception, shows that an individual 
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can have perceptual reasons and perceptual knowledge even though they are not in a 
position to have any knowledge concerning their own perceptual states and hence are 
not capable of having reflective knowledge that they perceives that p.  
I don’t want to argue for the claim that cases like Planet of the Blind are possible, 
even though it seems to me that they are. I simply want to note that in order for the 
claim at the heart of the reflective knowledge argument that perceptions provide their 
subjects with indefeasible reasons of the form that one perceives that p to be 
acceptable it will have to be shown that they are not. This is the knowledge of 
perception objection.  
 
 
 
7.  
 
So far I have presented McDowell’s version of the epistemic argument for 
perceptual disjunctivism – the reflective knowledge argument – and have attempted to 
show that McDowell can respond to the McKinsey problem, that he must deal with 
the phenomenal indistinguishability issue if his argument is to be acceptable, and that 
McDowell’s argument runs into the knowledge of perception objection. In this section 
I want to present an objection to the reflective knowledge argument originally 
propounded by Wright (2002; 2008).  
Wright’s objection can be presented as follows. For a consideration, R, to constitute 
a reason, defeasible or indefeasible, to believe that p it must be possible to validly 
infer p from R. This is the inferentialist conception of reason-hood that I briefly 
mentioned earlier and which I claimed McDowell commits himself to when he says 
that perception provide their subjects with reasons to believe that p by constituting 
indefeasible reasons of the form that one perceives that p. But this is not all it takes 
for R to constitute a reason to believe that p, according to Wright. In addition for R to 
constitute a reason for one to believe that p one must be able to have reason to 
endorse the claim which constitutes R independently of one having reason to believe 
that p itself. In other words Wright thinks that one has to rationally avow the claim 
which constitutes R without already being able to rationally avow p if R is to 
constitute a reason for one to believe that p. If one can have justification for R without 
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having prior justification for p then Wright says R can transmit it’s justification to p, 
and only then can it be a reason to believe that p:   
 
…a proper proof should be cogent – should be compelling. A 
cogent argument is one whereby someone could be moved to 
rational conviction of – or the rational overcoming of doubt about – 
the truth of its conclusion. So a chain of valid inferences cannot be 
cogent if only someone who already took themselves to be rationally 
persuaded of the conclusion could rationally receive whatever 
grounds purportedly warranted its premises as doing just that… to 
acquire a warrant for the premisses of a valid argument and to 
recognise its validity is thereby to acquire – perhaps for the first time 
– a warrant to accept the conclusion.37 
 
So Wright thinks that for R to be a reason for p one must be able to validly infer p 
from R and R must be capable of ‘transmitting’ the justification one has for it to p, 
where R can transmit its justification to p only if one can be moved to rational 
conviction of R even though one is not already rationally convinced of the truth of p. 
If, for example, p itself were part of the justification one has for R then R could not be 
a reason for p, according to Wright because if it were then in order to for one to 
possess justification for R one would already have to possess justification for p, which 
according to Wright’s conception of reason-hood is impossible.  
So Wright is saying for example that if the claim that there is rain water on Tom’s 
jacket is to be a reason to believe that it is raining then it must be possible to infer that 
it is raining from the claim that there is rain water on Tom’s jacket and it must be 
possible to justify the belief that there is rain water on Tom’s jacket without already 
having to possess reason to believe that it is raining in order for it to function as a 
reason to believe that it is raining. Since one cannot have justification for the claim 
that there is rainwater on Tom’s jacket without already having justification for the 
claim that Tom is wearing a jacket the former cannot constitute a reason for the latter 
according to Wright. Since one can have justification for the claim that there is 
rainwater on Tom’s jacket without already having justification for the claim that it is 
                                                 
37 Wright (2002), p.333 
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raining, however, it is possible, by Wright’s lights, that the former could be a reason 
for the latter, though a defeasible one.   
Now, McDowell says that one’s reason to believe that p that one’s perceptual 
experience provides one with is the reflectively knowable fact that one perceives that 
p – reflectively knowable, it will be recalled, because it is constituted by one’s 
reflectively knowable experience that has the state of the world which constitutes p as 
a constituent. If Wright is correct then it must be possible to infer ‘p’ from that 
proposition if it is to be a reason. Clearly it is possible to infer ‘p’ from the claim that 
one perceives that p, so McDowell’s perceptual reasons fulfil one of Wright’s criteria 
for reason-hood – indeed, this is exactly what we’d expect given that McDowell 
himself agrees with this criteria. In addition, however, if Wright is correct then in 
order for the claim that one perceives that p to count as a reason to believe that p it 
must be possible to justify the claim that one perceives that p independently of the 
claim that p: if that one sees that there is a lemon tree in front of one is to count as a 
reason to believe that there is a lemon tree in front of one for example, it must be 
possible to avow with rational propriety the claim that one perceives that there is a 
lemon tree in front of one without having any prior justification to believe that there is 
a lemon tree in front of one.  
But it seems that one cannot have justification to believe that one sees that there is a 
lemon tree in front of one without already having justification to believe that there is a 
lemon tree in front of one. This is because seeing that there is a lemon tree in front of 
one is phenomenally indistinguishable from a hallucination as of a lemon tree in front 
of one. Given this it seems that the only way one could rationally avow that one sees 
that there is a lemon tree in front of one is if one already has justification to believe 
that there is a lemon tree in front of one, that way one could have reason to believe 
that the perceptual state one is in is a sighting of a lemon tree and not a mere perfect 
hallucination of one.  
Now, if this is correct then according to Wright that one perceives that p cannot be 
a reason to believe that p afterall: since one can only rationally avow the former if one 
is already in a position to rationally avow the latter, for the reason that perceptions are 
phenomenally indistinguishable from hallucinations as of the same objects, it follows 
from Wright’s conception of reason-hood that that one perceives that p is not a reason 
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to believe that p. This is so, moreover, whether or not a disjunctive conception of 
perceptual experience is true, as Wright points out38.  
This is a problem for McDowell’s reflective knowledge argument for perceptual 
disjunctivism because the claim that the reason that one’s perceptual experiences 
provide one with to believe that p is that one perceives that p is central to McDowell’s 
derivation of perceptual disjunctivism from epistemic disjunctivism. That part of the 
argument says that since that one perceives that p is one’s perceptual reason to 
believe that p and since one’s perceptions must provide one with reflective knowledge 
of it if it is to be one’s reason, the perceptual state which constitutes the fact that one 
perceives that p must be reflectively knowable to one, and this can be the case only if 
it is an experiential state which has the state of the world which constitutes p as a 
constituent, as the disjunctivist suggests. The effect of Wright’s criticism is that 
McDowell cannot rely on the claim that one’s perceptual reason to believe that p is 
the fact that one perceives that p to derive perceptual disjunctivism from epistemic 
disjunctivism.  
So because seeing a lemon tree in front of one is phenomenally indistinguishable 
from a visual hallucination as of a lemon tree in front of one, one cannot have 
justification to make the former claim without already having justification to make the 
claim that there is a lemon tree in front of one, and this implies that that one sees that 
there is a lemon tree in front of one cannot be a reason to believe that there is a lemon 
tree in front of one. This causes problems for McDowell reflective knowledge 
argument for perceptual disjunctivism as we’ve seen. Before moving onto to look at 
replies to Wright’s objection in the next section however I want to finish this one by 
noting that the rationale Wright has for claiming that that one perceives that p cannot 
be a reason for one to believe that p can be understood to be another motivation for 
the key premise in the epistemic analogue of the argument from hallucination. This 
premise says that because perceptions and hallucinations are phenomenally 
indistinguishable they each provide us with the same reasons to believe that p. 
According to Wright the phenomenal indistinguishability of perceptions and 
hallucinations precludes the rational avowal of the claim that one perceives that p 
prior to the rational avowal of the claim that p and this precludes in turn the former 
functioning as a reason for the latter. If it is assumed that perceptions are supposed to 
                                                 
38 Ibid, pp.39-40; (2008), pp.396-400 
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provide their subjects with different reasons to believe that p to hallucinations only 
because they enable their subjects to have reflective access to the claim that one 
perceives that p then if it’s true, as Wright thinks, that phenomenal 
indistinguishability precludes the claim that one perceives that p constituting a reason 
to believe that p, then the key premise of the epistemic analogue of the argument from 
hallucination follows.  
 
 
 
8.  
 
We saw in the last section that McDowell’s reflective knowledge argument is 
vulnerable to an objection from Wright. According to this objection since that one 
perceives that p cannot be rationally avowed independently of the rational avowal of 
the claim that p itself that one perceives that p cannot constitute a reason to believe 
that p afterall. Hence, McDowell can’t rely on the claim that it is a reason in his 
reflective knowledge argument for perceptual disjunctivism as he does. In this section 
I want to examine a response to it. I will argue that it fails and hence that unless a 
better response is forthcoming Wright’s objection seems fatal to the reflective 
knowledge argument.  
According to the first response to Wright it is correct to say that if R is to constitute 
a reason to believe that p then not only must one be able to infer p from R but one 
must be able to rationally avow R without first having to rationally avow p, as Wright 
says. It follows that one must be able to rationally avow the claim that one perceives 
that p before one rationally avows the claim that p if the former is to constitute a 
reason for belief in the latter. Wright is wrong however to suggest that one cannot 
offer a rational avowal of the claim that one perceives that p independently of one’s 
rational avowal of the claim that p itself: one can, according to the response to 
Wright’s objection we’re now considering, rationally avow the claim that one sees 
that there is a lemon tree in front of one before one is in a position to avow that there 
is a lemon tree in front of one.  
How is this possible? According to the response we’re now considering McDowell 
claims that that one perceives that p is knowable by reflection. But if this claim is 
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right then doesn’t it follow that one can rationally avow that one perceives that p 
without having to rationally avow first that p? That is, if it is true that one can know 
that one perceives that p by reflection then that proposition can be rationally believed 
even though one doesn’t already rationally believe that p and therefore can function as 
a reason to believe that p afterall, so Wright’s objection fails.  
But why should we accept that if it is knowable by reflection that one perceives that 
p then one can rationally avow that one perceives that p without already having to 
rationally avow that p? One reason to accept it, so this response to Wright’s problem 
might say, is that if a claim is knowable by reflection then this implies that what 
justifies one’s belief that one perceives that p is one’s process of reflection itself, and 
one can undergo this process of reflection without having to be in a position to 
rationally avow the claim that p. Hence because one can know that one perceives that 
p by reflection one can have justification for that claim prior to any justification one 
has for the claim that p and Wright’s objection fails.  
One thing that should be noted about this response to Wright’s objection first off is 
that it presupposes that it is possible for one to know that one perceives that p by 
reflection even though perceiving that p is phenomenally indistinguishable from a 
hallucination as of p and as the we saw it is a substantial question whether that is the 
case. The current response to Wright’s objection has to have an answer to the 
phenomenal indistinguishability issue if it is to be acceptable.  
A second worry with this response to Wright is that it simply does not seem 
plausible to suggest that even if one can know that one perceives that p by reflection it 
follows that one can rationally avow that one perceives that p prior to possessing any 
justification for the claim that p itself. The defence of this claim offered by the 
respondent to Wright says that one’s process of reflection justifies one’s claim that 
one perceives that p without one having to have any prior justification for the claim 
that p itself. But is it really a correct picture of how reflective knowledge works to say 
that one’s process of reflection rationally justifies the claims that it puts one in a 
position to know? What exactly is it about the process of reflection which is supposed 
to justify the claim that one perceives that p? If this idea is not made more intelligible 
then it is not clear how the present response to Wright can substantiate it’s claim that 
one’s capacity to know that one perceives that p by reflection can put one in a position 
to rationally avow that one perceives that p without having to possess any justification 
to believe that p itself in the first place. 
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Due to Wright’s objection and the other objections presented in this chapter which 
it is not obvious how McDowell might respond to I conclude that we should reject the 
reflective knowledge argument. All is not lost for the epistemic argument for 
perceptual disjunctivism however as there is another more successful version of the 
argument available, or so I will argue in the next chapter.  
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III 
 
Perceptual Reasons 
 
 
 
 
 
In the previous chapter I outlined McDowell’s version of the epistemic argument for 
perceptual disjunctivism: the reflective knowledge argument. I outlined several 
problems for this argument: the McKinsey objection, the phenomenal 
indistinguishability issue, the knowledge of perception objection, and Wright’s 
objection. I argued that McDowell can meet the McKinsey objection but that it is not 
clear how he can meet any of the other objections. In this chapter I want to develop an 
alternative version of the epistemic argument for perceptual disjunctivism which is 
distinct from the reflective knowledge argument and which avoids the problems for it 
just mentioned. The version of the argument I want to develop doesn’t rely on the 
claim that one’s perceptual reason to believe that p is that one perceives that p but 
instead relies on a distinctive theory of what it is for perceptions to provide reasons 
for the beliefs about the world they support. I’ll develop this distinctive conception of 
perceptual reasons first, then I’ll show how it can be used to develop a version of the 
epistemic argument that is distinct from McDowell’s and which avoids the problem 
for it mentioned, then I’ll defend the emergent version of the epistemic argument from 
a group of fresh objections.  
 
 
 
1.  
 
The claim at the heart of McDowell’s reflective knowledge argument is the claim 
that that one perceives that p is the indefeasible reason one’s perceptual experiences 
55 
provide one with to believe that p. This is a reason to believe that p because ‘p’ can be 
validly inferred from it. Our perceptions enable one to possess this reason because to 
possess a reason is to have reflective knowledge of it and because experiences are 
knowable by reflection whilst also constituting the fact that one perceives that p this 
ensures that having a perceptual experience is sufficient to have reflective knowledge 
of an so to possess the indefeasible reason to believe that p: that one perceives that p.  
Embedded in this last paragraph are a number of claims about reasons, perceptual 
reasons, reasons possession, and what it is for perceptions to provide one with reasons 
that McDowell drew on in his reflective knowledge argument. The claims about the 
nature of reasons are:  
 
(A) Something can constitute a reason to believe that p only if ‘p’ 
can be inferred from it  
 
And, the claim which follows from (A): 
 
(B) Reasons to believe that p must be the sorts of things from which 
‘p’ can be inferred.   
 
(A) and (B) essentially state what I called earlier the inferentialist conception of 
reason-hood which McDowell and, seemingly, Wright as well as Brewer (1999), 
BonJour (1982; 2002), and Steup (2001) amongst many others work with.  
The claim about perceptual reasons in particular contained in the above summary of 
the position articulated by the reflective knowledge argument is: 
 
(C) Perceptual reasons in favour of p are indefeasible: they cannot be 
possessed by the subject if it is false that p.  
 
Claim (C) is motivated by the idea that all defeasible reasons – reasons the possession 
of which is consistent with the falsehood of p, for example the premises in an 
inductive argument for p – can only bequeath the subject knowledge with the aid of 
further background knowledge had by the subject which relates such evidence to the 
truth of p itself, in conjunction with the further idea that perceptual reasons can 
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bequeath subjects knowledge without relying on any such background knowledge 
possessed by the subject.  
The claim about reasons possession embedded in the paragraph summarising the 
position expressed by the reflective knowledge argument is:  
 
(D) To possess a reason is to have reflective knowledge of it: if R is 
to constitute a reason to believe that p then one must be capable 
of knowing R by reflection.  
 
Claim (D) can be motivated by the though that if reasons are knowable by reflection 
then they can be rationally avowable independently of the claims they are supposed to 
support. If this idea is correct, moreover, then (D) has the consequence that all reasons 
are reasons in Wright’s sense: they are claims which are rationally avowable prior to 
the claims that they are supposed to support.  
Finally, the claims about what it is for perceptions to provide one with reasons to 
believe that p contained in the summarising paragraph are:  
 
(E) Perceptual experiences provide their subjects with indefeasible 
reasons in part by constituting the facts from which p can be 
deduced which are themselves identical to reasons 
 
(F) Perceptions provide their subjects with indefeasible reasons also 
by enabling those facts to be reflectively knowable by the subject 
precisely because the subject’s experiences themselves are 
reflectively knowable and those experiences constitute the 
subject’s indefeasible reasons, as (E) suggests.  
 
Claims (E) and (F) together essentially state what I earlier called the premise-
constituting conception of perceptual reasons which says that provide one with 
reasons by constituting premises perceptions – reflectively knowable ones – from 
which ‘p’ can be deduced.  
Claims (A)-(F) are related to each other in a number of ways, some of which I have 
already made explicit. As I have said claim (A) entails claim (B). Since (B) is 
effectively equivalent to the claim that reasons are propositions (D) entails (B) given 
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that it is using the word ‘knowledge’ to mean ‘propositional knowledge’. (D) also 
implies that only true propositions can be reasons, since knowledge is factive. Both 
claims (E) and (F) presuppose that perceptual reasons are indefeasible as (C) suggests. 
Claim (E) presupposes claim (A) and with it claim (B). Claim (F) presupposes claim 
(D). Claims (E) and (F) express a conception of the manner in which perceptions 
provide their subjects with reasons that gain their motivation from claims (A)-(D) 
such that if any of those claims were to be rejected then so too could either or both of 
claims (E) and (F). 
I want to reject claim (A): I don’t think that a reason in favour of believing that p 
need be something from which ‘p’ can be inferred. With my rejection of (A) comes a 
rejection of (B): I want to deny that reasons to believe that p need be the sorts of 
things from which ‘p’ can be inferred. In other words I want to deny that all reasons 
need be propositions and a fortiori true propositions, as (D) entails. I want to accept 
(C): I want to say that perceptual reasons are indefeasible in the sense that the 
possession of them is inconsistent with the falsehood of the claims they support. But I 
want to reject (D): one doesn’t need to know R by reflection in order to count as 
possessing it. I want to reject (D) because I don’t think that one needs to have 
knowledge of one’s reasons to believe that p in order to possess reasons at all. All of 
this puts me in a position to reject (E) and (F): perceptions don’t provide us with 
reasons by constituting true propositions from which ‘p’ can be deduced and which 
we can know by reflection precisely because they are constituted by our reflectively 
knowable experiences.  
 
 
 
2. 
 
I want to begin to develop the account of perceptual reason which can, I will argue, 
be used to deliver a version of the epistemic argument for perceptual disjunctivism 
that is more satisfactory than McDowell’s and which incorporates a rejection of every 
claim mentioned in the previous section except claim (C), the claim that perceptual 
experiences provides one with indefeasible reason. The account I want to develop is 
structurally analogous to the account of ways of knowing developed by Williamson 
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(2000)39. I’ll present that account in this section and in the next I’ll present the 
account of perceptual reasons I want to defend.  
When one knows that p one does not know it simpliciter, there is always some 
determinate way in which one knows it. Examples of ways of knowing are memory, 
introspection, mathematical intuition, the testimony of others, and of course 
perception. Williamson develops a novel account of what it is for something to count 
as a way of knowing: of what it is for perceiving, introspecting, remembering, and in 
general Φing to count as a way of knowing that p40.  
The account relies on Williamson’s claim that knowing is a discrete kind of mental 
state41. Traditionally, many epistemologists have conceived of the state of knowing 
that p as a state composed of three discrete and more basic elements. The first element 
which the tradition claims forms a part of the state of knowing that p is the 
psychological state of believing that p: a subject cannot know that p without believing 
that p, hence the belief that p is a component of the state that constitutes knowing, 
according to the tradition. The second element which the tradition claims forms a part 
of the state of knowing that p is the truth of p or, alternatively, the fact that p: a 
subject cannot know that p without it being true that, hence the truth of p is a 
component of the state that constitutes knowing, according to the tradition. The third 
and final element which the tradition claims forms a part of the state of knowing that 
p is whatever component which needs to be added to the belief that p and the truth of 
p to make up the state of knowing, and following Alvin Plantinga we can call this 
component of knowledge, traditionally conceived, ‘warrant’42. We can think of 
warrant as a property that one’s belief that p has which relates one’s belief to the fact 
that p in such a way that one’s belief that p together with the truth of p can constitute 
knowledge that p. So according to the traditional view to know that p is to be in a 
complex state that constituted by a belief that p, the truth of p, and warrant to believe 
that p, whatever that is.  
A consequence of the traditional view is that there is no kind of state of mind that 
the subject can be in which is necessary and sufficient for knowing that p. This is a 
consequence of the traditional view because it says that the only psychological state 
                                                 
39 Williamson (2000), pp.33-41 
40 See Cassam (2007) for a discussion of ways of what it is for Φing to count as a way of knowing that 
p.  
41 Williamson (2000) defends this claim in chs. 2, 3, and 4. See Fricker (2009) for a critique of the 
claim that knowing is a state of mind.  
42 Plantinga (1993) 
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that the subject is in when she knows that p is her belief that p, the other components 
of the state of knowing are not states of mind, hence the traditional view has the 
consequence that there is no kind of mental state that is equivalent to knowing that p.  
Williamson rejects this consequence of the traditional picture of knowing that p and 
with it the traditional picture itself. That is, Williamson wants to say that there is a 
distinctive kind of mental state being in which is necessary and sufficient for knowing 
that p: just like believing or experiencing, knowing is a kind of psychological state. 
Since knowing is factive moreover – one cannot know that p unless p is true – it 
follows that on Williamson’s view there is some mental state that one can have to 
only true propositions. This constitutes a rejection of the traditional picture because if 
knowledge is a distinctive kind of psychological state then it cannot be composed of a 
belief that p, the truth of p, and a warrant to believe that p, as we have seen. Indeed, if 
we assume that the only way in which it could be composed of a set of discrete and 
more basic elements is if it were composed of a the three elements just mentioned 
then it follows from Williamson’s account that the state of knowing that p is itself 
metaphysically basic and is not composed of discrete and more basic elements at all43.  
Williamson’s distinctive account of knowledge dovetails with his distinctive 
accounts of what it is for something to be a way of knowing that p. According to 
Williamson ways of knowing that p are factive propositional attitudes – attitudes like 
seeing that p and remembering that p – which constitute states of knowing in the same 
way that particular colours constitute the state of being coloured. The state of being 
coloured is constituted by discrete colour properties like redness and greenness 
because the state of being coloured is a determinable state of which individual colour 
properties are determinates: being coloured is a state which can be instantiated by an 
object only if there is some determinate way of being coloured which constitutes that 
state. Similarly, Williamson wants to say, the state of knowing that p is constituted by 
propositional attitudes like seeing that p and remembering that p because the state of 
knowing that p is a determinable state of which those propositional attitudes are 
determinates: knowing that p is a mental state of a subject that can be instantiated by a 
subject only if there is some determinate way of knowing that p which constitutes that 
                                                 
43 If it is assumed further that the concept of knowledge is structurally isomorphic to the state of 
knowing then it follows from this in turn that the concept of knowledge is primitive and is not 
analysable into more basic concepts. This is indeed a claim that Williamson makes (2000, ch.1).  
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state. Factive propositional attitudes like seeing that p and remembering that p just are 
these ways of knowing that function as determinable for the state of knowing that p.  
 
 
 
3. 
 
I’ve just sketched Williamson’s account of knowledge and ways of knowing. I do 
not want to say whether I think either account is correct. I sketch them only because 
the account of perceptual reasons I want to develop has significant parallels with 
Williamson’s accounts of knowledge and ways of knowing. The account of perceptual 
reasons I want to develop is generated by the application of an account of what it is to 
possess a reason to believe that p in general to the case of the reasons that perceptual 
experience provides one with to believe that p in particular. I’ll sketch the general 
account and then apply it to the case of perceptual reasons in particular in the next 
section. A distinctive account of perceptual reasons will emerge.  
The general account of reasons possession I want to develop can be presented as 
follows. A reason to believe that p is any state of the world which is either a truth-
condition of p, if it is an indefeasible reason, or which renders the truth of p probable, 
if it is a defeasible reason. In other words any state of the world which is connected to 
the truth of p in either of these ways is a reason to believe that p. If it is connected to 
the truth of p by being a truth-condition of p then it is an indefeasible reason to 
believe that p. If it is connected to the truth of p by rendering p likely to be true then it 
is a defeasible reason to believe that p.  
By a ‘state of the world’ I don’t just means facts about the world or, what I am 
taking to be the same thing, true propositions about the world. States of the word 
which have different metaphysical profiles can count as reasons too, on the view to be 
developed here. For example, the beers in the fridge can be a reason to believe that 
there are beers in the fridge just as much as the fact that there are beers in the fridge 
can. This is the first claim that forms a part of the general theory of reasons I want to 
present.  
For a subject to be in possession of a reason, R, to believe that p, where, as the first 
claim states R is to be conceived of as a state of the world related to the truth of p in 
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either of the ways described – whether a fact about the world or a state of the world 
with a different metaphysical profile – according to the account I want to develop, is 
for two conditions to obtain. The fist condition (i) is that the subject must be in some 
psychological state that is directed towards R and has R itself as a constituent where 
this psychological state constitutes her possession of R: the first condition that the 
current account claims to be necessary for the possession of a reason to believe that p 
is that one must be in some psychological state that constitutes a relation between the 
subject and the state of the world which constitutes R, and this psychological state 
constitutes her possession of R. Where R is a fact this state will be a factive 
propositional attitude such as knowing that p, if Williamson is right to claim that 
knowing is a factive propositional attitude that is. If however R is not a fact but a state 
of the word which is related to the truth of p in either of the ways mentioned which is 
of a different metaphysical category then the psychological state in question need not 
be a propositional attitude but some other kind of state that can have states of the 
world as constituents.  
That’s the first condition that the current account claims is necessary for reasons 
possession. The analysis it expresses of the state of possessing a reason to believe that 
p is structurally analogous to the account Williamson gives of what it is to know that 
p. Condition (i) says that there is some psychological state that constitutes being in 
possession of a reason to believe that p where this reason is conceived of as a state of 
the world. Similarly Williamson says that there is some psychological state – a 
propositional attitude to be exact – that is identical to knowing that p and this 
psychological state is factive and therefore has the fact that p itself as a constituent. 
The account of reasons possession just sketched says that whenever one possesses a 
reason R, there is some psychological state that one is in which has the state of the 
world which constitutes R as a constituent and which constitutes one’s possession of a 
reason: a description of the agent’s psychological states should reveal whether she 
possesses a reason to believe that p, conceived of as a state of the world which is 
related to the truth of p in either of the ways described.  
Williamson’s account constitutes a rejection of any account of knowing that p 
which says that knowing that p is composed of the psychological state of believing 
that p in conjunction with the truth of p and warrant for p. Similarly Condition (i) of 
the account of reasons possession constitutes a rejection of any account of what it is 
for a subject to possess a reason R to believe that p which says that one can possess a 
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reason to believe that p, R, even if R is not a constituent of any psychological state 
that one is in. The account constitutes a rejection, for example, of any account of 
reasons possession which says that to possess a reason, R, to believe that p is to be in 
a psychological state that represents R as confirming the truth of p but which is 
merely caused by R, say, and doesn’t have R as a constituent. In virtue of insisting 
that condition (i) is a necessary condition of subject possessing a reason to believe 
that p, the account of reasons possession we are now considering says that it is purely 
a psychological of the agent that constitutes her possession of a reason to believe that 
p.  
So the first condition of a subject possessing a reason R to believe that p is that R 
must be a constituent of some psychological state that the subject is in where this 
psychological state constitutes one’s possession of the reason R. The second condition 
which is a necessary condition of a subject possessing a reason R to believe that p, 
where R is some state of the world which is a truth condition of p or makes p likely to 
be true, and which is together with (i) is sufficient for a subject to possess the reason 
R can be presented as follows.  
For a subject to possess a reason R to believe that p it is not enough that R is a 
constituent of the subject’s psychological state that constitutes her possession of R. 
That there is rainwater on Tom’s coat constitutes a defeasible reason for me to believe 
that it is raining because it makes it likely to be true that it is raining outside. 
Assuming that knowledge is a psychological state and that I know that there is 
rainwater on Tom’s coat I am in some psychological state with that fact, which 
constitutes a reason to believe that it is raining outside, as a constituent. Still, I don’t 
possess any reason to believe that it is raining outside unless in some manner I 
conceive of the fact that there is rainwater on Tom’s coat to be indicative of the truth 
of the claim that it is raining outside. Similarly a lemon tree in front of me might be a 
constituent of my visual experience, my visual experience might well count as a 
psychological state, the lemon tree in front of me might be an indefeasible reason to 
believe that there is a lemon tree in front of me because it makes that claim true, and I 
might therefore have a state of the world which constitutes a reason to believe that 
there’s a lemon tree in front of my as a constituent of a psychological state that I’m in, 
but that psychological state can’t constitute a possession of a reason unless I also 
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conceive in some way of the lemon tree in front of me as something which makes it 
true that there’s a lemon tree in front of me44.  
So if a psychological state which has R as a constituent is to constitute my 
possession of the reason R in favour of the belief that p then I must conceive of R as 
either a truth-maker of p, if R is an indefeasible reason to believe that p, or as 
confirming the truth of p, if R is a defeasible reason to believe that p. This rather 
inchoately specified thought is the second necessary condition of a subject possessing 
the reason R to believe that p which together with condition (i) is sufficient for a 
subject to possess the reason R. That is, the second necessary condition for a subject 
possessing the reason R to believe that p is (ii) a subject must conceive of R as either 
a truth maker of P if R is an indefeasible reason to believe that p or as making p likely 
to be true if R is a defeasible reason to believe that p if she is to possess it as a reason 
to believe that p.  
Presupposing the truth of the claim that reasons are states of the world that stand in 
the relations to the truth of p described and putting both condition (i) and condition 
(ii) together we get the following theory of what it is for a subject to possess a reason, 
which I will call the psychological theory of reasons possession:  
 
(PTRP): S possesses a reason R to believe that p iff either S is in 
some psychological state with R as a constituent and conceives of R 
as a truth maker of p, if R is an indefeasible reason to believe that p 
or S is in some psychological state with R as a constituent and 
conceives of R as making p likely to be true, if R is a defeasible 
reason to believe that p.  
 
(PTRP) is distinctive because it insists that one can possess a reason only if the 
state of the world which constitutes that reason is a constituent of a psychological 
state one is in. It implies that claims (A) and (B) are false because it presupposes that 
reasons to believe that p need not be the sorts of things from which ‘p’ can be 
inferred: they need not be propositions, although a true proposition about the world 
can constitute a reason according to (PTRP). It also implies that claim (D) is false: 
one need not have reflective knowledge of a certain proposition that constitutes a 
                                                 
44 Cf. Brewer (1999), ch.3 and BonJour (2002), pp.9-10 
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reason to believe that p if one is to possess a reason to believe that p. (PTRP) says that 
if knowledge is a psychological state then if a proposition that is a reason to believe 
that p is reflectively known then one is in a position to possess a reason to believe that 
p, but (PTRP) leaves it open that one can be in a position to possess a reason to 
believe that p if the state of the world which constitutes that reason is a constituent of 
some psychological state not identical to knowledge, assuming, again, that knowledge 
is a psychological state.  
This is the general account of reasons possession that I’ll be working with in this 
chapter. In the following two sections I want to apply it to the case of perceptual 
reasons in particular and then use the emergent theory of perceptual reasons to 
construct a version of the epistemic argument for perceptual disjunctivism which 
avoids the objections to the reflective knowledge argument I discussed in the previous 
chapter. After that I will offer a defence of (PTRP) and the account of perceptual 
reasons which emerges from it.  
 
 
 
4. 
 
(PTRP) is the general theory of reasons possession that I want to suggest, when 
applied to the case of perceptual reasons in particular, generates a theory of perceptual 
reasons which if assumed correct gives us a way of constructing a version of the 
epistemic argument for perceptual disjunctivism which is more successful than the 
reflective knowledge argument in so far as it avoids the objections to that argument 
outlined in the previous chapter. In this section I want to apply (PTRP) to the case of 
perceptual reasons and clarify the theory of perceptual reasons which emerges. I will 
also distinguish it from theories of perceptual reasons found in Steup (2001) and that 
utilised by the reflective knowledge argument.  
(PTRP) says that to possess a reason to believe that p, where reasons are conceived 
of as states of the world which are connected to the truth of p either by being a truth-
maker for p if the state of the world constitutes an indefeasible reason to believe that p 
or by rendering p likely to be true if the state of the world constitutes a defeasible 
reason to believe that p, is to have one such state of the world as a constituent of some 
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psychological state one is in and to and to conceive of it either as a truth-maker for p 
if it is an indefeasible reason or as making p likely to be true if it is a defeasible 
reason.  
Perceptions of an O which is F provide one with good reason to believe that there is 
an O which is F. When we have a reason to believe such a proposition provided to us 
by perception we have perceptual reasons. How are we to understand how a 
perception of an O which is F is to provide us with a reason to judge that there is an O 
which is F in the context of (PTRP)? That is, how should be conceive of perceptual 
reasons assuming that (PTRP) is true?  
(PTRP) states that psychological states which have states of the world which 
constitute reasons constitute possession of those reasons, given that one conceives of 
these states of the world as connected to the truth of the propositions they constitute 
reasons to believe. Perception of an O which is F provides one with reasons to believe 
that there is an O which is F. It seems that the correct way to combine these theses is 
to say that a perception of an O which is F just is a psychological state which has O 
and its Fness as constituents, where the O and its Fness constitute an indefeasible 
reason to believe that there is an O which is F, given that the presence of an O which 
is F is a truth-maker of the proposition that there is an O which is F. Perceptions of a 
state of the world provide one with reasons to believe in propositions that describe the 
existence of those states of the world because those states of the world are 
indefeasible reasons to believing in propositions that record their existence, and 
perceptions of them are psychological states that have them as constituents and which 
constitute one’s possession of them as reasons, assuming that the subject conceives of 
those states of the world as truth-makes of the judgements they constitute reasons for.  
On this account of perceptual reasons which falls out of (PTRP) perceptual 
experiences are ways of possessing reasons, where reasons are then conceived of as 
states of the world, and are not to be thought of as reasons themselves. They are ways 
of possessing reasons because to possess a reason is partly to be in some 
psychological state that has the state of the world that constitutes one’s reason as a 
constituent and perceptions are psychological states which have states of the world 
which constitute indefeasible reasons as constituents.  
On the account of perceptual reasons being developed here the relationship the 
possession of reasons and perceptual experience is structurally analogous to the 
account of the relationship between knowing and ways of knowing according to 
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Williamson. Williamson says that ways of knowing are to knowing as the state of 
being red is to the sate of being coloured: ways of knowing are determinable of the 
psychological state of knowledge. Similarly on the account of perceptual reasons that 
falls out of (PTRP) that we are now considering perceptions are to the state of 
possessing reasons to believe that p as the state of being red is to the state of being 
coloured: having a perception of an O which is F is determinate of the determinable 
state of possessing a reason to believe that there is an O which is F. This is because, to 
repeat, perceptions are psychological states which relate one to states of the world 
which are thought of as reasons, and being in such a psychological state is constitutive 
of what it is to possess a reason according to (PTRP), as long as one conceives of 
those states of the world as standing in certain relations to the truth of the propositions 
they are reasons for.  
It should be clear how the current account of perceptual reasons differs from the 
account which the reflective knowledge argument is married to, an account which is 
made up of the conjunction of claim (E) with claim (F). On that account indefeasible 
perceptual reasons are facts of the form that one perceives that p constituted by our 
perceptual experiences. Such facts count as indefeasible reasons for the belief that p 
because ‘p’ can be validly deduced from them. We count as possessing those reasons 
because we are capable of knowing those facts by perception. On the account of 
perceptual reasons that falls out of (PTRP) indefeasible perceptual reasons to believe 
that p are the states of the world that constitute p that are the constituents of our 
perceptions of such states of the world. Such states of the world count as indefeasible 
reasons because to believe that p because they make ‘p’ true. We count as possessing 
those reasons because the states of the world that make them up are constituents of 
our perceptions and perceptions are psychological states and we conceive of them as 
truth-makers for p.   
The account of perceptual reasons that falls out of (PTRP) is also distinct from an 
account of perceptual reasons offered by Steup (2001). Steup thinks that an 
inferentialist conception of reason-hood is true: he thinks that something can be a 
reason to believe that p only if one can infer it from p, and he thinks that it follows 
from this that all reasons are propositions. That is, Steup is committed to claims (A) 
and (B)45. To that extent he is in agreement with the conception of reasons that the 
                                                 
45 Steup (2001), p.1 
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reflective knowledge argument employs. He does not, however, think that one’s 
perceptual experiences provide their subjects with reasons to believe that p by 
constituting facts of the form that one perceives that p from which ‘p’ can be inferred. 
Instead he thinks that perceptual experiences provide their subjects with reasons to 
believe that p because they have true propositional contents from which ‘p’ can be 
inferred. On Setup’s picture perceptual experiences provide their subjects with 
reasons to believe that p because they enable true propositions from which ‘p’ can be 
inferred to function as premises in an inference to p46.  
So for example Steup says that one’s perception of a lemon tree in front of one is 
constituted by a perception with the true propositional content that there is a lemon 
tree in front of one and one’s experience provides one with this claim as a reason to 
believe that there is a lemon tree in front of one by enabling it to function as a premise 
in an inference to the claim that there is a lemon tree in front of one. This view differs 
from the view of perceptual reasons which the reflective knowledge argument utilises 
because although it is committed to the claim that perceptual reasons are the sorts of 
things from which ‘p’ can be inferred, it carries with it no commitment to the claim 
that perceptual reasons are identical to facts which record the existence of one’s 
perceptual experiences of the form that one perceives that p and it carries with it no 
commitment to the view that one needs to have reflective knowledge of the claims 
which constitute one’s reasons in order for one to count as possessing those reasons. 
Instead, on Steup’s view one’s perceptual experiences provide one with reasons by 
having them as propositional content.  
I want make clear how Steup’s view and the view of perceptual reasons which 
emerges from an application of (PTRP) are similar and how they are different. On 
Steup’s view perceptual experience provide one with reasons to believe that p by 
enabling propositions to function as premises in an inference from which ‘p’ can be 
inferred, and it is the propositional contents of perceptual experience which function 
as reasons, not perceptual experiences themselves. Perceptions give one access to 
reasons instead of constituting them.  
On the view of perceptual reasons which emerges from the application of (PTPR) 
perceptual experiences perceptual reasons are identified with the states of the world 
which one’s perceptions present one with and are not identical to perceptual 
                                                 
46 This view is similar to that propounded by Brewer (1999) and possibly Crane (2001).  
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experiences themselves. Perceptions give one access to reasons instead of constituting 
them. This is what the view which emerges from the application of (PTRP) has in 
common with Steup’s view. Unlike Steup’s view however, the theory of perceptual 
reasons which emerges from the application of (PTRP) doesn’t carry with it any 
commitment to the idea that reasons to believe that p are true propositions or the sorts 
of things from which ‘p’ can be inferred and so doesn’t carry with it any commitment 
to the claim that perceptions have true propositional contents. The view which 
emerges from the application of (PTRP) can also be used as a basis to construct a 
version of the epistemic argument for perceptual disjunctivism, unlike Steup’s view. 
In the next section I turn to this argument.  
 
 
 
5. 
 
In the previous section I applied (PTRP) to the case of perceptual reasons. The 
emerging theory of perceptual reasons says that perceptual experiences are ways of 
possessing reasons, specifically they are ways of possessing indefeasible reasons to 
believe propositions which record the existence of the mind-independent states of 
affairs that form the constituents of the psychological state constitutive of perception. 
In this section I want to show how this theory of perceptual reasons can be used to 
construct a version of the epistemic argument for perceptual disjunctivism.  
I will start with what the first part of the new version of the epistemic argument: the 
transition from the anti-sceptical claim the epistemic disjunctivism. The new version 
of the epistemic argument that I want to develop here affects the inference from the 
anti-sceptical claim to epistemic disjunctivism in a similar way to the manner in 
which the reflective knowledge argument affected the inference, but without any 
reliance on the claim that that one perceives that p is one’s perceptual reason to 
believe that p.  
The first part of the new version of the epistemic argument can be presented as 
follows. A perception of an O which is F puts its subject in a position to know that 
there is an O which is F whereas a hallucination as of an O which is F, even though it 
is phenomenally indistinguishable from the perception, does not. This is the anti-
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sceptical claim. What explains why such perceptions put us in a position to know 
things whereas phenomenally indistinguishable hallucinations don’t is that they 
provide us with indefeasible reason to believe that there is an O which is F whereas a 
hallucination doesn’t. The indefeasible reason to believe that there is an O which is F 
of which perceptual experience constitutes our possession is the O and its Fness – a 
state of the world which is a constituent of the perceptual experience. Since one could 
have a hallucination as of an O which is F even though there is no O which is F one 
does not possess such an indefeasible reason to believe that there is an O which is F 
when one has a hallucination as of an O which is F and this is what explains why 
hallucinations as of an O which is F don’t put us in a position to know that there is an 
O which is F. Hence what explains why perceptions and hallucinations differ with 
respect to whether they put us in a position to know that there is an O which is F is 
that they provide us with different reasons even though they are phenomenally 
indistinguishable as the epistemic disjunctivist suggests.  
So the first part of the new version of the epistemic argument says that what 
explains why perceptions put us in a position to know things whereas hallucinations 
don’t is that they provide us with indefeasible reasons whereas hallucinations don’t, 
just as the reflective knowledge argument says. Where the new version of the 
epistemic argument differs from the reflective knowledge argument is in its 
suggestion that the indefeasible reason which one’s perception provides on with is 
identical to the state of the world that is the truth maker of the proposition that it 
enables one to know, and which is a constituent of one’s perception. The reflective 
knowledge argument identifies perceptual reasons with facts about one’s perceptual 
states of the form that one perceives that p whereas the new version of the epistemic 
argument identifies them with states of the world that constitute truth-makers of the 
propositions one’s perceptions enable one to know and which one has access to via 
perception.  
That’s the first part of the new version of the epistemic argument for perceptual 
disjunctivism. I now move onto the second part: the transition from epistemic 
disjunctivism to perceptual disjunctivism. The new version of the argument affects the 
inference from epistemic disjunctivism to perceptual disjunctivism in a different way 
to the way in which the reflective access argument attempts to affect the inference. In 
particular it does not rely on the claim that one needs to have reflective knowledge of 
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whatever it is that constitutes one’s reasons to believe that p in order to count as 
possessing those reasons.  
The new version of the epistemic argument says that perceptual experiences 
provide one with indefeasible reasons to believe that there is an O which is F that are 
identical to the states of the world that are constituents of ones perceptual experiences. 
Since hallucinations don’t provide one with such reasons, perceptions and 
hallucinations provide one with different reasons even though they are phenomenally 
indistinguishable. This is what epistemic disjunctivism amounts to according to the 
new version of the epistemic argument. The new version of the epistemic argument 
assumes the correctness of (PTRP) and consequently it assumes that in order for 
perceptions to provide their subjects with indefeasible reasons it must be the case that 
perceptions are psychological states of the subject which have the states of the world 
which are identical to those indefeasible reasons as constituents. Perceptions of an O 
which is F provide their subjects with an indefeasible reason to believe that there is an 
O which is F which is identical to the O and its Fness, and that state of the world is 
itself a truth-maker of the proposition that there is an O which is F. But by (PTRP) a 
perception of an O which is F can only provide one with such a reason if it is 
constituted by a psychological state – a state of the subject’s mind – which has the O 
and it’s Fness as constituents.  
Now, it can be the case that a perception of an O which is F can have O and its 
Fness as constituents and be a psychological state of the subject only if perceptual 
disjunctivism is true. To see why, if assume that perceptual disjunctivism is false then 
perceptions of mind-independent objections are states that are composed of three 
elements: experiential states that are of the same kind as the experiential states one 
suffers when one undergoes a hallucination as of an O which is F, the state of the 
world made up of the O and its Fness, and some extrinsic property of the experiential 
states which relates it to the O and its Fness such that one counts as perceiving the O 
and its Fness such as a suitable causal relation between the experiential state and the 
O and its Fness. But on such a picture a perception of an O which is F is not itself a 
psychological state because the only psychological state one is in when one perceives 
if such a picture of perception is correct is the experiential state that is the same in 
kind as that which one undergoes when one suffers a hallucination, the other 
components of the state of perception are not themselves psychological states, so if a 
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non-disjunctivist picture of perceptual experience is correct then perceptions aren’t 
psychological states. 
It follows that if perception is to be a psychological state that has O and its Fness as 
constituents as it must be if it is to provide one with indefeasible perceptual reasons 
given the truth of (PTPR) then perceptual disjunctivism is true: perceptions provide 
one with indefeasible reasons but, according to the argument we are now considering, 
this can be the case only if they are psychological states which have states of the 
worlds as constituents and are hence a different sort of experiential state from that 
which constitutes hallucination, as the perceptual disjunctivist suggests. 
This is the second part of the new version of the epistemic argument for perceptual 
disjunctivism. It relies on the claim that if perceptions are to enable us to possess 
reasons then they must be identical to psychological states which constitute our 
possession of those reasons. It then infers from this that this can be the case only if 
perceptual disjunctivism is true because if perceptual disjunctivism were false then 
perceptions would not be psychological states at all. This brings out a parallel 
between what the perceptual disjunctivist says about perception and what Williamson 
says about knowledge. Williamson’s account of knowing that p is inconsistent with 
the idea that knowing is identical to a state composed of a belief, the truth of the 
belief, and warrant. The new version of the epistemic argument relies on the claim 
that likewise, the perceptual disjunctivist’s account of perception is inconsistent with 
the idea that perceiving is identical to a state composes of an experience the same in 
kind as hallucination, the object and properties perceived, and some extrinsic property 
of the experience that relates it to the object and properties perceived, for example as 
an effect to cause. I’ll call the new version of the epistemic argument for perceptual 
disjunctivism which relies on (PTRP) and the theory of perceptual reasons which falls 
out of it the psychological access argument.  
 
 
6. 
 
The psychological access argument is objectionable because it relies heavily on the 
theory of perceptual reasons which falls out of (PTRP), and (PTRP) is itself 
objectionable. In the following section I’ll attempt to respond to a couple of 
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objections to (PTRP) and this will constitute a defence of the psychological access 
argument. In this section I want to point out that the argument avoids the problems 
which beset the reflective knowledge argument and is to that extent to be the preferred 
version of the epistemic argument for perceptual disjunctivism.  
The first objection that was presented against the reflective knowledge argument 
was the McKinsey objection. According to that objection the reflective knowledge 
argument is unacceptable because it carries with it a commitment to the idea that one 
can know that one perceives that p by reflection, and this implies that subjects who 
are at least moderately cognitively sophisticated can know that p by reflection. But it 
is counter-intuitive to say that one can know fact about the world by perception. I 
argued that there is a response which McDowell can give to this objection. Be that as 
it may it is certainly not the case that the psychological access argument runs into the 
objection because it doesn’t commit itself to the claim that one can know by reflection 
that one perceives that p when one does. It commits itself to the claim, rather, that 
perceptions provide one with reasons because they are psychological states which 
constitute one’s possession of reasons conceived of as the states of the world which 
are constituents of those perceptions.  
The second objection that was presented against the reflective knowledge argument 
was the phenomenal indistinguishability issue. According to this objection the 
reflective knowledge argument relies on the claim that we can have reflective 
knowledge of our perceptual states and this claim cannot be accepted until it has been 
shown that the phenomenal indistinguishability of perceptions and hallucinations that 
are as of the same object doesn’t preclude knowledge of one’s perceptions by 
reflection. This objection cannot be made against the psychological access argument 
because that argument, again, doesn’t make the assumption that one can know by 
reflection that one perceives that p.  
The third objection that was presented against the reflective knowledge argument 
was the knowledge of perception objection. This objection states that it’s counter-
intuitive to suggest that perceptual knowledge and even the possession of perceptual 
reasons is mediated by knowledge of one’s perceptual states as the reflective 
knowledge argument assumes because of the possibility of cases which constitute 
counter-examples to that claim such as Planet of the Blind, a case in which a subject 
is capable of possessing visual-perceptual reasons and hence visual-perceptual 
knowledge even though she possesses no concept of visual and so is unable to form 
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any judgements about what visual states she is in. The psychological access argument 
doesn’t claim that perceptual knowledge and the possession of perceptual reasons is 
mediated by knowledge of one’s perceptual states. It says instead that perceptual 
experience provide one with reasons because they are psychological states which have 
reasons conceived of as states of the world as constituents. This is all it takes to 
possess perceptual reasons according to the psychological access argument. As such 
the psychological access argument is perfectly consistent with cases like Planet of the 
Blind.  
The final objection that was presented against the reflective knowledge argument 
was Wright’s objection. According to this objection one cannot rationally avow the 
claim one perceives that p unless one already has justification for the claim that p 
itself and this precludes the claim that one perceives that p functioning as one’s 
indefeasible reason to believe that p because it a condition of a claim being a reason to 
believe that p that one can infer p from it and that one can rationally avow it without 
having prior justification for p itself. The psychological access argument avoids this 
objection because doesn’t claim that that one perceives that p is one’s perceptual 
reason to believe that p in the first place and so one does not need to be able to 
rationally avow this proposition prior to possessing any justification for the claim that 
p in order to possess a reason to believe that p. Instead the psychological access 
argument rejects the inferentialist picture of reason-hood that Wright assumes is 
correct when he says that in order for a claim to constitute a reason to believe that p it 
must be rationally avowable prior to one possessing justification for the claim that p 
itself.   
I conclude, then that the psychological access argument avoids all the objections 
that I presented against the reflective knowledge argument. To that extent, then, the 
former is to be preferred as a version of the epistemic argument for perceptual 
disjunctivism to the latter.  
 
 
 
7.  
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The version of the epistemic argument for perceptual disjunctivism just propounded 
attempts to use the theory of perceptual reasons which emerges from the application 
of (PTRP) to infer the truth of perceptual disjunctivism. But the theory of perceptual 
experiences which emerges from the application of (PTRP) is objectionable. In this 
concluding section I’ll attempt to address two problems with the view.  
The first problem can be presented as follows. According to the theory of 
perceptual reasons which emerges from the application of (PTRP) a perception of an 
O which is F enables one to count as possessing the indefeasible reason constituted by 
the O and its Fness to believe that there is an O which is F because a perception is a 
psychological state of the subject with the O and its Fness as constituents and such a 
psychological state constitutes what it is for a subject to possess a reason, assuming 
that the subject conceives of the O and its Fness as a truth-maker of the claim that 
there is an O which is F, as (PTRP) states.  
We saw that according to the psychological access argument it follows from the 
claim that perceptions are psychological states with states of the world as constituents 
that perceptual disjunctivism is true. This is because if perceptual disjunctivism is 
false then perceptual states are not psychological states with states of the world as 
constituents at all. It might well be conceded that only if perceptual disjunctivism is 
true can perceptions be psychological states with states of the world as constituents. 
 According to the first objection I want to consider however a subject need not be in 
a psychological state which has the O and its Fness as constituents in order for her to 
count as possessing the indefeasible reason that that state of the world constitutes to 
believe that there is an O which is F, as (PTRP) suggests. Instead a subject can be in a 
state which is merely composed of certain psychological and non-psychological 
elements that has the O and its Fness as constituents in order to count as possessing a 
reason constituted by that state of the world to believe that there is an O which is F. 
The upshot of this is that even if perceptual disjunctivism is false and perceptual 
experiences of an O which is F are not psychological states with the O and its Fness 
as constituents a subject can still count as possessing that indefeasible reason to 
believe that there is an O which is F, so the psychological access argument does not 
work.  
According to the objection we are now considering, then, a perceptual experience 
of an O which is F composed of an experience as of an O which is F the same in kind 
as a hallucinatory experience, the O and its Fness themselves, plus some extrinsic 
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property of the experience as of an O which is F which relates it to the O and its Fness 
in such a way that the experience can count as a perception of an O which is F such as 
a causal link between the experience and O, is sufficient for one to possess the 
indefeasible reason to believe that p constituted by the O and its Fness themselves to 
believe that there is an O which is F. It is not necessary that one’s perception 
constitutes a psychological state with the O and its Fness as constituents if it is to 
constitute the state of possessing an indefeasible reason to believe that there is an O 
which is F, according to this objection.  
In response to this suggestion I want to protest that it looks as if one doesn’t count 
as possessing the indefeasible reason to believe that there is an O which is F 
constituted by the state of the world made up of the O and its Fness if the perceptual 
state that is supposed to constitute one’s possession of such a reason is a non-
psychological state composed of psychological and non-psychological components. 
 To see why consider the case of Steve and Sam. Let’s assume that Steve has a 
‘perception’ of a lemon tree in front of him which is composed of the psychological 
and non-psychological components listed above. Let’s assume that Sam has a 
perception of a lemon tree in front of him which is a purely psychological state which 
has the lemon tree as a constituent. Let’s also assume that both Steve and Same 
conceive of the lemon tree they experience as a truth-maker for the judgement there is 
a lemon tree. Let’s also assume that neither Steve nor Sam have any knowledge about 
their perceptual experiences. In particular, Steve doesn’t know whether his experience 
is related in any way to the lemon tree itself. It seems that Sam counts as possessing 
an indefeasible reason to believe that there is a lemon tree but does Steve?  
I think the answer is ‘no’. Afterall Steve doesn’t have any knowledge of whether 
there is a relation between the experience he’s having and the lemon tree itself. 
Should we not conclude, then, that there is no suitable sense in which Steve can be 
counted as having access to a reason to believe that there is a lemon tree anymore than 
he would have if he were to have a true belief that there is a lemon tree in front of him 
which is caused in some suitable way by the lemon tree itself? Why should the latter 
sort of state fail to constitute the possession of a reason even though, according to the 
account of perceptual reasons possession utilised by the current objection, an 
experience which has the experience which has the exact same structure can? If a 
theory of perceptual reasons possession which falls out of an application of (PTRP) is 
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not assumed then it just looks mysterious why reliably formed true beliefs can’t give 
one reasons but perceptions, which have the exact same structure as such belief, can. 
I’ve sketched a response to the first objection to the psychological access argument. 
I now want to move onto the second, which can be presented as follows. The 
psychological access argument identifies perceptual reasons with states of the world. 
It says that the proper way to understand how perception provides one with 
indefeasible reasons is to take it that perceptions give us access to those states of the 
world by being constituted by psychological states that have those states of the world 
as constituents. Perception provides us with reasons when we have such access and 
we conceive of the states of the world in question as truth-makers of the judgements 
they constitute indefeasible reasons for. But it is hardly intelligible that a subject in 
such cases counts as possessing a reason to believe that there is an O which is F. 
Afterall if anyone asked her what her reason was to believe that there is an O which is 
F she may well not be in a position to provide them with anything from which p could 
be inferred, or which could make p rationally compelling, so in what sense does she 
count as possessing a reason at all? 
In responding to this objection I want to point out that there is a perfectly 
intelligible sense in which the subject counts as possessing a reason to believe that 
there is an O which is F when she has a perception of an O which is F that is 
constituted by a psychological state that has that state of the world as a constituent 
and she conceives of that state of the world as a truth-maker for the judgement that 
there is an O which is F. Because the subject who enjoys such a perception of an O 
which is F conceives of the states of the world made up of the O and its Fness as a 
truth-maker for the judgement that there is an O which is F there is a state of affairs 
which is part of her conscious perspective on the world in virtue of being a constituent 
of the psychological state constitutive of perception – the state of the world made up 
of the O and its Fness – which she conceives of as a confirming the truth of her 
judgement that there is an O which is F. Because it is a requirement of the theory of 
perceptual reasons which emerges from the application of (PTRP) that the subject 
conceives of the state of the world that constitutes the indefeasible reason to believe 
that there is an O which is F that her psychological perceptual state has a constituent 
as a truth-maker of that judgement if that psychological state is to constitute her 
possession of reasons to believe that there is an O which is F the account has the 
consequence that whenever perception constitutes her possession of a reason there 
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will be something within her first-person perspective which she conceives of as 
confirming the truth of the claim that there is an O which is F.  
But if this is a consequence of the theory of perceptual reasons which emerges from 
the application of (PTRP) then there is surely a perfectly intelligible sense in which 
the subject genuinely counts as possessing reasons to believe that there is an O which 
is F when she is in a psychological perceptual state that has the O and its Fness as 
constituents and she conceives of the O and its Fness as a truth-maker of the 
judgement that there is an O which is F. I conclude, then, that the second objection, 
like the first, fails to do damage to the psychological access argument. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
I have attempted to show that there is an epistemic argument for perceptual 
disjunctivism to be found in McDowell’s writings on the matter. I distinguished two 
versions of the argument: the reflective knowledge argument, which I attributed to 
McDowell, and the psychological access argument, which was constructed using the 
theory of perceptual reasons which emerges from an application of (PTRP). I 
attempted to show that the psychological access argument is superior to the reflective 
knowledge argument to the extent that it avoids the problems which I argued beset the 
latter. The take home message of this essay is that if it is assumed that experiences 
give us access to reasons conceived of as states of the world by being constituted by 
psychological states which have those states of the world as constituents then it is 
possible to construct a version of the epistemic argument for perceptual disjunctivism 
which looks like it stands a better chance of working than the reflective knowledge 
argument.  
At the end of the previous chapter I attempted to respond to two criticisms of the 
psychological access argument. I do not pretend that there are not additional 
criticisms of that argument that one might make. For example it might be objected 
that according to the theory of perceptual reasons which emerges from (PTRP) a 
perception of an O which is F provides its subject with an indefeasible reason to 
believe that there is an O which is F by being constituted by a psychological state 
which has the state of the world made up of O and its Fness as constituents, and the 
subject conceives of that state of the world as a truth-maker for the claim that there is 
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an O which is F. But surely the subject counts as conceiving of the O and its Fness as 
a truth-maker for the claim that there is an O which is F only if she believes that the O 
and it’s Fness make it true that there is an O which is F. This implies that it is a 
consequence of the current theory of perceptual reasons that a subject must possess a 
certain kind of belief about the content of his perception if his perception is to enable 
him to possess a reason to believe that there is an O which is F. But this surely 
contradicts the claim made by the theory of perceptual reasons we are now 
considering that is perceptions themselves which constitute what it is for their subjects 
to count as possessing reasons to believe that there is an O which is F, not perceptions 
of an O which is F plus some further belief which says that the O and its Fness are 
truth-makers of the judgement there is an O which is F. 
I think that in order to respond to an objection like this those wishing to defend the 
theory of perceptual reasons which emerges from an application of (PTRP) need to 
find a way of showing that our conceiving of the O and its Fness as a truth-maker for 
the claim that there is an O which is F is built into our perception of an O which is F 
itself and is not constituted by a belief that me might have in addition to that 
perception. I do not want to pursue this line of thought here. It will be enough for my 
purposes if I have managed to show that there is a version of the epistemic argument 
for perceptual disjunctivism which can be constructed using the theory perceptual 
reasons which emerges from an application of (PTRP) and which avoids the 
objections that beset McDowell’s version of the argument. 
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